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Abstract 
 
My first essay, Domestic, Nonfinancial Commercial Paper after 2000, examines why the commercial paper 
(CP) outstanding of domestic nonfinancial firms plunge in early 2000’s and never recover. By looking at 
the past 21 years from January 1993 to December 2013, with a sample including all domestic, non-financial, 
non-utility firms that have CP ratings from Moody's, I find two main results. First, I find that firms’ 
financing needs have been decreasing at the aggregate level since 2000. Additionally, although there have 
been constant new entrants, a big decline in CP market entry largely due to the credit deterioration of U.S. 
corporations since 2000, coupled with a high CP market exit rate largely due to a significant credit 
deterioration in the CP market itself has led to a large decline in CP issuers. With the average firm’s CP 
issuance generally stable, the entire CP outstanding has remained at a low level. Among all firms, P-1 rated 
firms appear to contribute the most to the decrease of CP outstanding.  An examination of the industry 
composition also provides evidence that firms from some industries that used to participate in CP market 
has now stopped accessing the market. Secondly, when a firm with a prime rating (P-1/P-2) expect a credit 
downgrade, has a lower M/B ratio, is a relatively small firm, has decreased investment opportunities, 
inventory or sales growth, and has increased cash holding or tangibility, it is more likely to exit the CP 
market. Upon exiting, it is likely to resort to its cash holding, private placement bonds or acquisition notes. 
For a firm with a non-prime rating upon exiting, it is likely to make changes in many areas of its debt 
structures. Finally, evidence is found that for firms exiting the CP market, the cost of their drawn down 
loan commitment is significantly increased. 
 The second essay, China’s Delisting Rule and Its Impact on Listed Companies, studies whether 
Chinese loss firms take earnings management measures to improve their accounting performance after 
China’s 1998 accounting-based regulation on firm delisting. I use the delisting rule as identification strategy 
and apply Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to examine whether loss reversed firms resort to accrual 
manipulation, real activity manipulation or other methods of earnings management in order to reverse their 
loss. My result consistently shows that firms that are just able to reverse loss in the third year use less non-
operating net income and this result is mainly driven by firms that have the least amount of loss in the 
second year.  
iii 
The third essay, Soft Information and Internal Credit Ratings of Bank Loans, answers whether soft 
information plays an important role in a bank’s internal credit ratings and if it does, whether it leads to a 
“better” or “worse” prediction of the borrowing firm’s future financial health through an empirical study in 
the Chinese banking industry. Understanding how banks’ internal ratings work is important both for us to 
understand banks’ lending and corporations’ financing behavior, and for assisting banks’ transition to more 
complicated risk management system and assisting bank regulators for their bank regulations decisions. 
Results from this research show that soft information indeed affects internal ratings. Furthermore, soft 
information contributes positively to a bank’s prediction of a firm’s loan performance and future financial 
health. This paper contributes to the literature by examining the evolution of internal ratings and by relating 
internal ratings to the real outcomes of loans. 
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Chapter 1 
Domestic, Nonfinancial Commercial Paper after 
2000 
1.1 Introduction 
Commercial Paper (CP) market in the U.S. is a large and important debt market which before 2008 
accounted for the largest proportion of money market mutual fund (MMMF) assets (see Figure 1.1). At the 
end of 2012 $1 trillion in CP was outstanding and is 6.5% of GDP in that year1. In the fourth quarter of 
2012, daily placements of CP averaged about $58.53 billion, principally in maturities of 90 days or less, 
and each day an average of about 1,933 firms issued new paper2. The CP market for domestic non-financial 
firms is one of the major sources of short-term public financing and liquidity for large U.S. corporations 
and accounts for about 10% of all paper outstanding (see Table 1.1 for the composition of CP market). 
 Domestic Non-Financial Commercial Paper (DNFCP) had enjoyed a steady growth from 1945 to 
2000. Then in November 2000, right before the 2001 Recession3, the level of outstanding CP plunged (see 
Figure 1.2). By September 2002, the DNFCP market had shrunk by more than 50% in its annual outstanding 
level! From then on, the DNFCP outstanding has been fluctuating around the low level and has never 
recovered. Using the annual GDP as a benchmark, DNFCP outstanding vs. GDP in my sample increased 
from 0.415% to 1.61% from 1991 to 2000, but then dropped to 0.483% in 2003 following 2001 recession, 
and then again to 0.306% in 2009 following the financial crisis. Looking at the past 21 years from January 
1993 to December 2013, with a sample including all domestic nonfinancial firms that have CP ratings from 
                                                     
1 See https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 for data on real GDP and CP outstanding. GDP for 2012 is 15,354.6 billion dollars (in 
Chained 2009 Dollars) and CP outstanding in 2012 is 992.8 billion dollars. 
2 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/cp/volumestats.htm for data whose source is supplied by The Depository Trust and 
Clearing Corporation, http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload. 
3 2001 recession is from March 2001- November 2001 as defined by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau 
of Economic Research. It lasted 8 months which is slightly less than average for recessions since World War II. November 2001 is 
the beginning of an expansion. 
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Moody's, I answer the following question: why did the CP outstanding of domestic nonfinancial firms 
plunge in the early 2000’s and never recover? 
   The current CP literature has carefully examined the cyclicality of the CP market. One strand of 
paper show that aggregate CP issuance is countercyclical, and CP issuance rises during downturns to 
compensate for reduced bank financing (e.g., Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox 1993, Gao and Yun 2013). While 
Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1995) challenges this view and suggests that CP issuance is pro-
cyclical at the firm level since it is positively correlated with sales and earnings. 
 The existing CP literature has also contributed to the knowledge of the use of CP and firm-level 
characteristics of CP issuers. Evidence is found that CP is strongly correlated with increases in accounts 
receivable and despite its short maturity, CP is used to finance long-term projects. Specifically, CP is used 
for financing inventories and capital expenditures, or as bridge financing for short-term debt, and is later 
refinanced with long-term debt to limit rollover risk or to minimize transaction costs (e.g., Calomiris et al. 
1995, Kahl, Shivdasani, and Wang 2015). As shown in Calomiris et al. (1995), only firms with high credit 
quality can enter into the CP market. If we hold constant long-term credit quality, access to CP market also 
depends on a variety of firm characteristics, such as large size, high collateral levels, high earnings levels, 
low earnings variance, and large stocks of liquid assets.  
 The existing literature has generally looked at the commercial paper market as one continuous 
development through the years. While in this paper, I document that the CP market is drastically different 
after 2000 and examine the change and reason for the change that happened in the DNFCP market after 
2000. 
 Other than CP literature, my paper is also related to the capital structure, especially debt structure 
literature. Collar, Ippolito and Li (2013) uses a sample of public U.S. firms from 2002-2009. They find that 
large rated firms simultaneously employ multiple types of debt; while all other firms, which comprise the 
majority of listed firms in the U.S., make use of only one type of debt. They also find that large, mature, 
profitable firms with more tangible assets, high leverage, and a credit rating use multiple sources; while 
firms with high growth opportunities, cash holdings, cash flow volatility, R&D expenses, and advertising 
expenses, and firms with unique products and a strong board, specialize in few types of debt. Rauh and Sufi 
(2010) uses a sample of 305 randomly selected nonfinancial rated public U.S. firms from1996-2006. They 
find that almost ¾ of their firm-year observations employ more than two types of different debt instruments; 
and that ¼ of the sample firms experience a significant change in debt composition. High credit firms (BBB 
and higher) use primarily two tiers of capital – equity and senior unsecured debt; while low credit quality 
firms (BB and lower) tend to use several tiers of debt. In this research, I examine the change in firms’ debt 
structure after they exit the CP market from 2000 - 2013.   
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 I have two main results. First, I explain why CP outstanding remains low since 2000. Firms’ 
financing needs (i.e. total debt, total inventory, accounts receivable, capital expenditure) have been 
decreasing at the aggregate level since 2000. Additionally, although there have been constant new CP 
entrants, a big decline in CP entry largely due to the credit deterioration of U.S. corporations since 2000, 
coupled with a high CP exit rate largely due to a significant credit deterioration in the CP market itself has 
led to a combined effect of having more exits than entry in the CP market. Thus, with the large decline in 
CP issuers and the average firm’s CP issuance being generally stable, the entire CP outstanding has 
remained at a low level. Although firms decrease in all rating category in the CP market, being the largest 
issuer along with having the largest decrease in firm number in the CP market, P-1 rated firms appear to 
have contributed the most to the decrease of CP outstanding.  An examination of the industry composition 
of firms provide evidence that firms from some industries that used to participate in CP market now stop 
accessing the market.  
 My second finding explores the characteristics of those firms that would exit the CP voluntarily 
and the outcome for all exiting firms.  For a firm with a prime rating (P-1/P-2), it is more likely to exit the 
CP market when it expects a credit downgrade, has a lower M/B ratio, is a relatively small firm, has 
decreased investment opportunities, inventory or sales growth, or has increased cash holding or tangibility. 
Upon exiting, it is likely to resort to its cash holding, private placement bonds or acquisition notes. In 
summary, when firms voluntarily exist the CP market, a small number of them might expect to do so 
because of a perceived future decline in credit worthiness. However, more seem to exit due to lack of need 
to be in CP market or having sufficient cash holdings. For a firm with a non-prime rating, it is likely to 
make changes in many areas of its debt structures upon exiting. Evidence is also found that for all firms 
exiting the CP market, the cost of their drawn down loan commitment is significantly increased. Therefore, 
it appears that firms resort to cash holding to replace CP borrowing rather than line of credit.  
 This paper contributes to the literature on CP market, debt structure, and corporate liquidity by 
examining CP borrowings, an important source of short-term funding for large firms, and its relationship 
with firms’ other substitutes for short term funds, especially credit lines and cash holdings. This research 
improves our understanding of the behavior of DNFCP by examining firms’ characteristics and firms’ 
short-term financing decisions making; it also provides evidence and “food for thought” to policy-makers 
regarding regulatory and monetary decisions affecting banks, firms, the CP market, and MMMFs. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details of the data sources, sample 
construction and summary statistics. Section 3 examines the factors that contribute to the drastic decline of 
DNFCP since 2000 at the aggregate and firm level. Section 4 concludes. 
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1.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
1.2.1 Sample Construction 
 Since firms are not required to report their CP issuance, firm-level data on CP activity are not 
readily available to the public or for academic use4. Therefore, I have hand-collected 21 years of annual 
and quarterly outstanding CP rating and outstanding data from January 1993 to December 2013.  
 First, I compiled a comprehensive set of firm-level Moody’s CP ratings from the inception of CP 
ratings in the early 1970s (with the first rating being on September 30, 1971) to the end of 2013 collected 
from Moody’s website. Due to regulatory guidelines, Moody’s has to post most (if not all) of their credit 
ratings online5. This assures the completeness of the Moody’s credit ratings in my sample. CP has credit 
risk and most papers are rated by one or more nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations (NRSRO), such as Moody’s Investor Service (Moody’s), Standard and Poor’s (S&P),  and 
Fitch Ratings. In this paper, I use one of the most extensively used ratings for CPs - Moody’s CP ratings. 
Table 1.2 shows Moody’s short-term ratings definition. 
 Second, I construct a sample of CP borrowing data by collecting all available annual or quarterly 
amounts of CP outstanding information from their 10-K / 10-Q electronic filings (for most firms, they 
became electronically available starting in 1992 or 1993). This results a comprehensive firm-level panel 
dataset of CP borrowings and Moody’s CP ratings from early 1990s (with the earliest time being 1991) to 
the end of 2013. It was then matched to Compustat for firms’ fundamentals and Dealscan for loan data and 
cost of revolvers. As shown in Figure 1.2, on average, my sample matches the Federal Reserve’s published 
aggregate domestic nonfinancial CP outstanding at a 71% rate.  
 Following Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013), I drop firms that are utilities, financial firms 
or quasi-public firms. Specifically I exclude firms that are in the following SIC categories: 4899 < SIC < 
5000 or 5999 < SIC < 7000 or SIC > 8999. I then drop the firm-years with a missing, negative or 0 firm 
total assets. The final sample includes 8,385 firm-years with 392 unique domestic nonfinancial firms from 
1993 to 2013. 
 I combine three sources of information to determine when a firm enters or exits the CP market: 
Moody’s rating start and end date, 10-K and 10-Q texts, and CP outstanding amounts. I define the date 
when a firm first obtains its CP rating or has its first non-zero CP outstanding, whichever comes first, as 
the date of its entry into the CP market. I define the date when a firm receives a “NP” (non-prime) or “WR” 
                                                     
4 Capital IQ (CIQ) has collected CP outstanding data since early 2000’s and I have compared my collected data with CIQ CP data 
whenever possible. However, for firms that have both international and domestic CP, CIQ normally collects the aggregate amount, 
while I need the domestic outstanding only. There are also other discrepancies between their data and mine (e.g. due to mismatch 
with the Compustat fiscal year).  
5 This is further confirmed by a long-time representative at Moody’s Investor Service. 
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(withdraw) rating or when CP outstanding first becomes 0 for consecutive 2 years as the date of its exit 
from the CP market. I then double check by reading through 10-K or 10-Q for explicit indication of firm 
entering or exiting the CP market whenever available.   
 I notice that many firms have zero-valued observations for their year-end CP outstanding although 
they actually have issued CP during the year. There is also a clear seasonality pattern in the quarterly data 
of CP outstanding. Downing and Oliner (2007) also report a year-end phenomenon. They find that term 
premiums for CP often jump up at year-end. Similarly, I find a year-end reduction in CP outstanding. Based 
on Musto (1997), one explanation is that institutional investors have incentives to substitute Treasury bills 
and other safe instruments for CP at year end in order to present a less risky portfolio in their balance sheet. 
A second explanation is that some firms and individuals have an increased demands for cash holdings ahead 
of the year-end, as proposed by Griffiths and Winters (2005). A third possible reason is that some firms 
have larger cash flow coming in at year end (for example, firms in retail business), thus reducing the need 
for external financing. Because of this seasonality, I decide to only use annual CP outstanding data instead 
of the quarterly data. In order to mitigate the year-end zero CP problem when firms actually issue CP during 
the year, I use the average CP outstanding calculated from the quarterly data to replace the “misleading” 
zero outstanding amounts whenever they occur.  
 I further winsorize the variables at the upper 99% and lower 1% bound in order to remove outliers. 
Table 1.3 shows the summary statistics of all the key variables that are used in subsequent analysis. 
 In the next section, I explore the reasons that could have contributed to CP’s downward trend. 
1.3 Evidence from the CP Market 
1.3.1 Aggregate level - demand side story 
 First, I examine this phenomenon at the aggregate level.  
 One explanation could be that general macroeconomic conditions have caused firms’ general need 
for total debt to drop. Consequently, firms’ need to borrow in CP market decreases. It has been identified 
by exiting literature (e.g. Calomiris et al. 1995) that CP is used for financing inventories and capital 
expenditures and it is also strongly correlated with increases in accounts receivable, all of which are 
correlated with general economic conditions. If this is true, we would expect that when economic conditions 
worsen, inventories, receivables and capital expenditures decline, and consequently, CP needs are reduced. 
Therefore, if we were to observe that firms’ total debt, total inventories, accounts receivables and capital 
expenditures have been decreasing since 2001, we can contribute this as one reason for the decrease of 
aggregate CP outstanding.  
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 As shown in Figure 1.3, this is exactly the case. Firms’ total debt (scaled by total assets) is in an 
upward trend before 2001, reaches its highest level between 1998 and 2001, and then decreases dramatically 
right after 2001 and remains at a low level ever since. Firms’ total inventory, total receivables, and capital 
expenditure (all scaled by total assets) have been in a downward trend since 1998. This indicates that the 
reduction in CP outstanding can be partially due to the reduction of firms’ general needs of debt. 
  However, this is not the sole reason. Again as indicated in Figure 1.3, I also find that although CP 
used to contribute a big proportion to all of these four accounts, its percentage value invariably reaches its 
peak in 2000 and decreases dramatically afterwards and has been staying at a relatively low level ever since. 
The fact that the reduction of CP is not proportional to the reduction of the accounts it finances shows that 
firms must have resorted to other forms of debt to satisfy their financing needs. In another word, there must 
be some other factors that are at work to reduce the CP outstanding.  
 Naturally, my next question is what could be the other factors that lead to the decrease of firms’ 
CP borrowings? This leads to the following analysis.  
 
1.3.2 Aggregate level - supply side story 
 My first inquiry is: could the decline in outstanding CP be due to a drop in the number of CP issuing 
firms or to a reduction in each firm’s average CP issuance? Figure 1.4 Panel A shows that the number of 
CP issuers has been steadily dropping since its peak of 223 firms in 2000 to only about half of that number 
(112 firms) in 2013. In contrast, based on Figure 4 Panel B, average CP issuance appears to bounce back 
fairly quickly right after the 2001 recession and the 2009 financial crisis. Apparently, the decrease in CP 
outstanding is due to a decline in the number of CP issuers rather than a reduction in the amount each issuer 
is borrowing from the CP market.  
 What has caused the reduction in the number of CP issuers then? To answer this, I first examine 
the composition of CP issuers and seek to answer the following question: is it mainly a gradual exodus of 
existing issuers which caused the CP to shrink, potentially indicating a “dying” market? Or is CP still a 
viable market that has a mix of new and old issuers? Figure 1.5 shows that the CP market continues to have 
a significant number of new entrants. However, while from 1994 to 2000, there are more entries than exits 
into the CP market, starting from 2000, the opposite is generally true. This has led to the combined effect 
of a net decline in the total number of CP issuers after 2000 although more than 90% of the CP issuers each 
year are retained from the previous year. Apparently, CP market is still a viable market with constant new 
entrants.  
 However, why are there fewer entries and more exits? For the former, is it because there is a general 
deterioration in firms’ credit ratings so that fewer reputable firms are available to enter the market? To 
check this, I examine the universe of all Compustat Non-financial firms that have an S&P long-term firm 
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rating. The reason to do so stems from a high correlation of firms’ long-term rating with their CP ratings, a 
fact documented in Moody’s (2004). According to Moody’s Investor Service report on short-term 
ratings methodology on October 24, 2012 (Moody’s 2004), “Moody’s short-term ratings are opinions on 
the relative likelihood of timely payment on short-term financial obligations, including commercial paper.” 
“The key determinant for assigning a short-term rating to an issuer is that issuer’s long-term risk of default.” 
Consequently, “an issuer’s short-term rating is normally derived from its long-term rating.” The close 
relationship between the credit risk of long-term and short-term debt of the same issuer lead to a somewhat 
intentionally mechanical mapping between long-term rating and short-term rating. For example, A2 and 
above long-term ratings almost always get mapped to P-1; A3 to Baa2 get mapped to P-2. Non-matching 
do happen in practice, but it is rare and tends to last for a short period of time.  There is also a close mapping 
relationship between the long-term (or short-term) ratings among different rating agencies. The mapping 
of long-term and short-term ratings between Moody’s and S&P standards as depicted in Figure 1.6 reflects 
exactly this.  
 Since high credit quality is a requirement for entry into the CP market (Calomiris et al. 1995), I 
focus on examining only the highest quality firms in the Compustat universe. Figure 1.7 indicates that for 
the universe of Compustat’s nonfinancial, non-utility firms, the number of firms with A ratings (defined as 
having one of "A", "A+", "A-", "AA", "AA+", "AA-", "AAA" S&P long-term firm ratings and 
corresponding to Moody’s CP P-1 rating) increases from 1990 to 1998. However, since 2000, this number 
has been steadily decreasing. The percentage of A-rated firms among all Compustat’s nonfinancial, non-
utility firms has also gradually decreased from 35% in 1991 to 20% in 2000 and then to 13% in 2014. Since 
high credit quality is a necessary condition for entry into the CP market, the shortage in supply of high 
credit corporate issuers provides strong anecdotal evidence as to why there is a lower number of entrants 
into the CP market.  
 Similarly, in my sample on the CP market, I find evidence of firm credit deterioration. As shown 
in Figure 1.8, in general, firms with all ratings have enjoyed steady growth in the CP market before 2000. 
Although there is a decline in number for firms of all ratings after 2000, P-1 firms get the biggest hit and 
declines the fastest. The number of P-1 firms begins to decrease dramatically from 2000 to 2006 and then 
continues to stay at a low level. The percentage of P-1 firms in the CP market also steadily decreases from 
more than 50% in 1994 to barely 30% in 2006 and stays at a low level since then. On the other hand, P-3 
and below rated firms have increased from around 15% in 2000 to around 25% between 2001 and 2013. 
With the increase of P-3 and non-prime rated firms in the CP market after 2000, more firms have to 
involuntarily exit the market. Additionally, after 2000, P-2 firms dominate the CP market in number. 
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MMMF has been the largest holder of CP. Based on SEC Rule 2a-76, MMMF are restricted to hold no more 
than 5% of their assets in tier-1 (e.g. P-1 rated) securities of any one issuer. This number drops to 0.5% 
when being applied to tier-2 (e.g. P-2 rated) securities of any single issuer and additionally MMMF can 
hold no more than 3% of the fund’s total assets in total tier-2 securities. As can be seen, the restriction on 
holding tier-2 papers is much stricter than holding tier-1 papers in MMMF. Credit deterioration in the CP 
market, as exemplified by the increase of P-2 below firms and decrease of P-1 firms, thus increases the CP 
exit rates after 2000.  
 So far we have seen the effect of credit deterioration on the CP market entries and exits. The 
decreasing supply of prime grade firms from the Compustat universe appears to be a contributing factor to 
the low level of CP entry. The high percentage of P-2 and below firms in the CP market after 2000 could 
explain the high exit rates. The combined effect thus lead to a lower entry rate and higher exit rate in the 
CP market after 2000.  
 Further evidence in Figure 1.9 panel A shows that based on annual average issuance, other than 
being the highest rated firms, P-1 firms are also the largest CP issuers. Although the average issuance for 
both P-1 and P-2 firms drops from 2001-2003, starting in 2003, P-1 firms have continued to grow and 
become even bigger CP issuers than before 2000 and increase their average issuance between 2005 to 2013 
to two to three times of its lowest level in 2003, while P-2 firms fluctuate at a relatively stable level and P-
3 firms decrease in average issuance. However, since P-1 firms decrease greatly in number after 2000 (as 
shown above in Figure 1.8), the total annual issuance of P-1 firms have decreased since 2000 (as depicted 
in Figure 1.9 Panel B).  P-2 and below firms also have a decline in total annual issuance due to the decline 
in number of firms. Thus the combined effect is decreased total CP outstanding. 
 I further explore if there has been any industry composition shift in the Compustat universe for the 
nonfinancial and non-utility firms or in the CP market that may help shed some light on the CP reduction. 
As shown in Figure 1.10, weighted by total assets for all Compustat firms, among the 8 non-financial and 
non-utility industries based on the first number of firms’ SIC code, three have seen changes over the years. 
The largest non-financial industry - transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services 
industry (SIC 4) has some minor decline in total assets since 2001 and correspondingly, a small change in 
firm number composition in the same period, too. For the other two much smaller industries, mining and 
construction industry (SIC 1) and manufacturing group 1 (SIC 2 – which includes food, tobacco, textile, 
apparel lumber, paper, chemical products and petroleum refining industries), the former has been growing 
in total assets with a relatively small growth in firm numbers, while the latter has seen a small decline in 
total assets with a stable firm number composition in the market. I notice that manufacturing group 2 (SIC 
                                                     
6 Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/cp/about.htm. 
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3 - which includes leather, stone, metal products and telecommunication and transportation equipment) has 
kept a stable market share in total assets although its firm numbers have been declining greatly since 2000.  
As for the CP market, with result shown in Figure 1.11, we can see that for the two largest industries in the 
CP market - manufacturing group 1 (SIC 2) and manufacturing group 2 (SIC 3), while manufacturing group 
2 (SIC3) firms have been relatively stable in both total assets (around 24%) and firm number compositions, 
manufacturing group 1 (SIC 2)  has been growing rapidly in CP market share, from having similar market 
share with the manufacturing group 2 (SIC3) in 2000 (26% vs. 21%) to being 1.6 times of it in 2014 (42% 
vs. 26%) . Transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services industry (SIC 4) have been 
declining drastically in total assets since 2000 with only a small decline in firm number composition. Its 
market share (based on total assets) dropped from 30% in 2000 to only 12% in 2014. There is a small 
decrease in both total assets and firm number composition for mining and construction industry (SIC 1).  
 With the total CP outstanding declining dramatically since 2000, if an industry has relatively stable 
or even increased market share in the Compustat universe, a stable or reduced CP market share of that 
industry would indicate a reduced firm participation from the particular industry. Based on the facts 
discussed in the previous paragraph, except for manufacturing group 1 (SIC 2)7, all of the other three 
industries (SIC 1, SIC3 and SIC 4)8 have shown evidence of lowered participation in the CP market. Let’s 
take SIC 3 group of firms as an example. Shen (2003) listed examples of firms, such as Lucent Technologies, 
Nortel Networks, Motorola, in the telecommunication industry (with the first two SIC code being 36) that 
pulled out of the CP market because rating downgrade in the early 2001. This result provides another reason 
for the decline of DNFCP outstanding - firms that used to participate in CP market now turn away. 
 So far, evidence have been shown that both supply and demand factors have affected CP 
outstanding at the aggregate level since 2000. Next, I will start to look for firm level evidence for my 
question.  
   
1.3.3 Firm level evidence – credit story or cost story? 
 In this section, I will explore why firms exit the CP market. For firms that are forced out the CP 
market due to a non-prime rating, I will examine what debt instruments they would resort to afterwards. 
For firms with prime credit, I will test whether they would exit the CP market voluntarily and if so, why. Is 
it because they can foresee a credit decline in the near future (the so called “credit story”)? Is it because 
                                                     
7 This group of firms have a small decrease in total assets in the Compustat universe but a big increase in CP market share.  
8 SIC 2 firms have an increase in total assets while a decrease CP market share; SIC 3 has stable total assets in both Compustat 
universe and the CP market; and SIC 4 firms have only minor decrease in the Compustat universe while big decrease in CP market 
share.  
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they have alternative financing measures to relieve their need of CP? Or is it because they have a low cost 
alternative (the so called “cost story”)?  
 For the alternative financing means, I will focus my tests on revolvers and cash holdings. CP entails 
rollover risk. First of all, because of its short maturity, CP issuers generally issue new papers to retire the 
old ones, thus making it a rolling form of debt. The credit risk lies in that the issuer may not be able to issue 
new CP when the old papers come due. Most issuers obtain credit enhancements, such as line of credit (or 
revolver). Therefore, I suspect that firms may resort to revolvers if they exit the CP market - either when 
they are forced out of the market and need to pay off their old papers or when they voluntarily exit the 
market and are able to get a cheaper rate on the revolvers. Secondly, CP is usually used by companies to 
raise cash needed for current transactions. When there is enough cash holdings, I suspect that firms would 
choose to stop issuing the papers and turn to their cash holdings for current transaction needs since cash 
holdings are cheaper than CP under most circumstances.  
 I separate my sample into four groups as indicated in Table 1.4. I name the group of firms that stay 
in the CP market throughout my sample period with P-1 or P-2 ratings as Group 1; the group that exits the 
CP market with the last rating being P-1 or P-2 as Group 2; the group of firms that exit the CP market with 
last rating being P-3 or NP Group 3; and lastly, Group 4 for the very small number of firms that remain in 
the CP market with a non-prime credit rating (P-3 or NP). Although P-3 can be considered prime, firms 
normally cannot stay long after being downgraded to P-3. Thus, I consider it as a non-stable prime state 
and put it along with the other non-prime rating in Group 3 and 4. I suspect Group 4 firms will either have 
to improve their financial situation quickly or they will soon exit this market. Therefore, I will not examine 
Group 4 in this paper but rather focus my attention on comparing Group 1 and 2, and then Group 2 and 3. 
The summary statistics of key variables in each group are presented in Table 1.5.  
 I start out to explore the reasons for Group 1 and 2’s different decisions. Given both firms having 
good credit rating and history of borrowing in the CP market, what leads them to decide whether to stay or 
exit the CP market? I am particularly interested in finding out why Group 2 exits the CP market. Is it 
because it expects its credit rating to deteriorate in the near future? Or is it because it has found a low cost 
alternative? Could this low cost alternative be the line of credit that is required when setting up the CP? Or 
is it because it has enough cash flow from its operation? Or maybe a combination of all of the above? 
  Figure 1.12 shows that for this combined primary rating group (Group 1 and Group 2 firms), Group 
1 firms’ proportion has been increasing over the sample period. This means conditional on having good 
ratings, more firms choose to stay in the CP market instead of exiting.  
 First, I want to examine whether these two groups of firms are fundamentally different. Table 1.6 
Panel A compares Group 1 and Group 2 with all key variables normalized by total assets except size which 
is measure by log(total assets) or log(sales). As can be seen, the two groups are substantially different in 
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many ways, and these differences are also statistically significant. On average, Group 1 are bigger firms, 
have a lower cost of borrowing via loan commitments, have more cash holdings and more operating cash 
flow, have less investment opportunities (measured by capital assets), have bigger inventory, have a faster 
sales growth, have lower leverage, have less tangible assets, have a bigger M/B, have more working capital, 
have more CP borrowings, have less free cash flows, have bigger accounts payable and receivables, and 
have a lower total debt. 
 Next, I explore whether Group 2 firms exit the CP market because they expect a rating downgrade 
in the near future. Here, I use the S&P long-term firm rating 1 to 3 years after Group 2 firms exit the CP 
market as my measure of firms’ future credit. Grouping method of the S&P ratings is presented in Table 
1.7 Panel D and mapping method of S&P long-term rating to Moody’s CP rating again can be found in 
Figure 1.6.  
 Table 1.7 Panel A and C show that for P-1 firms, after 1 year, 65% firms still retain their P-1 ratings 
(corresponding to S&P firm rating 1) and this number drops to 54% in year 2 and year 3. For P-2 firms, 
70% firms retain their primary rating (corresponding to S&P firm rating 1 and 2) after year 1 and this 
number remain relatively stable for the next two years. In summary, although some firms do get 
downgraded to a lower rating9 after exiting the CP market, on average, around 54-70% of the firms retain 
their primary ratings (i.e. do not get downgraded) even after 3 years. This means, although there may be a 
small number of firms who expect a credit downgrade and thus exit accordingly, majority of the firms in 
Group 2 voluntarily choose to exit the CP market.  Table 1.7 Panel B further shows that the average post-
exit ratings for both last rating P-1 or P-2 firms are well within the prime rating range (≤ 2). It also provides 
evidence that CP ratings and S&P long-term firms ratings do correlate well.  
 Using the firm characteristics identified by existing literature (i.e. Calomiris et al. 1995) as 
important determinants for CP issuance, I further examine the factors that are important to a firm’s exit 
decision by running a probit regression with the independent variables being those important firm 
characteristics and the dependent variable being one if a firm exits the CP market and zero otherwise. As 
shown in Table 1.8, when looking at the full sample, for a firm that has a prime credit rating (P-1 / P-2), it 
will be more likely to exit the CP market, if the following happens: 
 If it expects its future credit to decrease; 
 If it has a lower M/B ratio;  
 If it is a relatively small firm; 
 If its investment opportunity or inventory decreases (i.e. financing needs decrease); 
 If its cash holding increases (i.e. alternative financing); 
                                                     
9 Downgrading happens when P-1 firms gets S&P Firm Rating 2+; or when P-2 firms gets S&P Firm Rating 3+. S&P Firm Rating 
= 3, 4 is comparable to Moody’s CP Rating = P-3, NP.  
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 If its bank commitments draw down is more expensive (which contradicts the cost story); 
 If its tangibility is greater;  
 Or if its sales slow.  
 When looking at the results based on the sample prior to and after the 2001 Recession, the main 
difference we see is that investment opportunities, inventory needs, and sales growth lose statistical 
significance in the post-2001 sample. In contrast, cash holdings, bank commitment draw downs, and 
leverage become important after 2001.  
 I then compare the key capital structure components as identified in the debt structure literature 
(e.g. Collar, Ippolito & Li 2013, Rauh and Sufi 2010) and aim to discover if there is any change before and 
after Group 2 firms’ CP exit by using t-test on the pre-exit and post-exit paired samples. I have presented 
only the debt instruments that have shown statistically significant changes in Table 1.9 Panel A. It appears 
that after exit, Group 2 increases its 114A private placements of bond and acquisition notes, reduces its 
public bond issuance and shelf-registered debt. The percentage of public bond and shelf-registered debt 
compared to total debt also decreases. There is no significant change in its bank debt, either for bank term 
loans or bank revolvers.  
 Combining the results from Table 1.8 and 1.9, it appears that Group 2 firms are most likely exiting 
the CP market either for credit concerns, because there is a decline in their financing need, or because they 
have sufficient cash holdings. It is unlikely Group 2 firms are going to resort to loan commitments because 
of their high costs. I do not find evidence of Group 2 firms using other lower cost alternative financing 
means, either. It is likely that P-1 firms exit because there is increased cash holdings which alleviate their 
needs on CP issuance; while P-2 firms exit because either they foresee a credit decline in the near future or 
because they can resort to cash holdings to lower their costs since P-2 paper rates are much higher than P-
1. Figure 1.13 also provides some anecdotal evidence that firms’ cash holdings increase quickly after 2001 
while CP level decreases when compared to cash holdings, indicating that cash holding could well be an 
alternative financing source for CP.   
 In the following section, I will explore the difference between the financing means of Group 2 and 
Group 3 firms after they exit the CP market.  
 I apply a similar t-test as to Group 2 on the pre-exit and post-exit paired samples for Group 3 firms. 
From Figure 1.14 Panel B, it can be seen that after 2001, firms that exit the market involuntarily (Groups 
3) and those that do so voluntarily (Group 2) are comparable in number. However, as shown in Figure 1.9 
Panel A, except for 2004 and 2005, on average, P-1 and P-2 firms issue more CP than P-3 firms. Thus, 
firms voluntarily exiting the CP (Group 2) appear to have a bigger effect on lowering the CP issuance than 
those exiting the CP market involuntarily (Group 3).  
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 Furthermore, for Group 2, it may use CP temporarily followed by borrowing in the bond market. 
However, for Group 3 firms facing worse credit quality, they may have worsened access to the bond market. 
A notable example was in May 2005 when GM and Ford were downgraded to junk status, coinciding with 
a wide-spread sell-off of their corporate bonds. The question is how might Group 3 firms react once they 
are involuntarily out of the CP market? Would they resort to internal cash holdings or bank revolvers? 
 Table 1.9 Panel B shows that after exiting the CP market, Group 3 firms shift to more bonds, bank 
term loans, mortgage debt and equipment notes, and less medium term notes. Consequently, there appears 
to be a shift from short-term to long-term funding. Despite a decline in their commercial paper rating, these 
firms appear to remain sufficiently credit-worthy to access longer-term sources of financing. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 The above analysis provides evidence for a credit-related, and both supply-side and demand-side 
channel explanation for the long-term decline in the DNFCP market.  
 First, at the aggregate level, there has been a big decline in firms’ general financing needs (i.e. total 
debt, total inventory, accounts receivable, capital expenditure) since 2000. Additionally, although CP 
market is still viable with constant new entrants, on the one hand, a general downgrade of corporate credit 
since 2001 reduce the supply of CP issuers and raise the bar of CP market entry; on the other hand, credit 
deterioration in the CP market, exemplified by higher percentage of P-2 and below firms in the market after 
2000, appears to have led to the high exit rates. Although higher-rated firms are more likely to maintain 
their CP programs after 2001, the combined effect of having more exits than entry in the CP market leads 
to the decline in CP issuers. Although on average, the CP issuance per firm does not change much since 
2001, total CP outstanding decreased along with the number of issuers. With firm number decreasing in all 
rating category in the CP market, being the largest CP issuer along with having the largest decrease in firm 
number in the CP market, P-1 rated firms appear to have contributed the most to the decrease of CP 
outstanding.  An examination of the industry composition of firms provide evidence that firms that used to 
participate in CP market now stop accessing the market. 
  Next, at the firm level, there is little evidence that firms voluntarily exit the CP to take advantage 
of lines of credit because my test shows that the costs of such borrowing is actually higher when firms exit. 
Rather, when firms voluntarily exist the CP market, a small number of them might expect to do so because 
of a perceived future decline in credit worthiness. However, more seem to exit due to lack of need to be in 
CP market or having sufficient cash holdings. It appears that P-1 firms exit because there is increased cash 
holdings and P-2 firms exit because they plan to resort to cash holdings as a cheaper source.  While CP 
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ratings are a significant factor in firms’ decision to exit the CP market, it could also be due to significantly 
higher costs of CP participation when a firm’s rating is lowered from P-1 to P-2.10 .  
 I find that for a firms with a prime rating (P-1/P-2), it is more likely to exit the CP market when it 
expects a credit downgrade, has a lower M/B ratio, is a relatively small firm, has decreased investment 
opportunities, inventory or sales growth, and has increased cash holding or tangibility. Upon exiting, it is 
likely to resort to its cash holding, private placement bonds or acquisition notes. For a firm with a non-
prime rating and has to leave the CP market involuntarily due to rating downgrade, upon exiting, it is likely 
to make changes in many areas of its debt structures. Even with a tainted credit, they appear to retain access 
to long-term sources of financing.  
  
                                                     
10 For example, money market mutual funds, which are one of the largest purchases of commercial paper, have regulatory 
restrictions on the amount of P-2 rated paper that they can hold.  
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1.5 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1.1 Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) portfolio holdings 1986 – 2012 
This figure plots the time series of different account compositions in MMMF based on total assets. The source is 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/.  
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Figure 1.2 2013 End-of-year Domestic Nonfinancial CP Outstanding 1991-2013 
This figure plots the time series of year-end CP outstanding from 1991 to 2013. It also compares my hand-collected sample data 
with the Federal Reserve’s published data. On average, my sample matches the Fed’s aggregate domestic nonfinancial CP 
outstanding at 71% rate. 
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Figure 1.3 Sample firms’ aggregate demand 1991-2013 
This figure plots the time series of aggregate level of four accounts: total debt, total inventory, total receivable, and capital 
expenditures (all scaled by beginning of year total assets). For all four panels, the left axis represents the aggregate parameter (total 
debt, total inventory, total receivable, and capital expenditures) level (scaled by total assets), and the right axis represents the 
percentage composition of commercial paper (CP) compared to the respective parameter level. 
 
 
  
18 
 
Figure 1.4 Number of DNFCP Issuers and Average CP Issuance 1991-2013 
Panel A of this figure plots the time series of the number of DNFCP issuers from 1991-2013. Panel B of this figure plots the time 
series of DNFCP average annual issuance from 1991-2013. 
 
Panel A: Number of CP Issuers 1991-2013 
 
 
 
Panel B: Average CP Issuance 1991-2013 
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Figure 1.5 Percentage of DNFCP market firm entries and exits 1994-2013 
This figure plots the time series of the annual DNFCP market number of entries and exits and the combined increase / decrease of 
the DNFCP market.  
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Figure 1.6 Mapping of Moody’s and S&P Long-term and Short-term Ratings 
This figure presents the mapping of the Moody’s long-term and short-term, and S&P’s long-term and short-term ratings.  
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Figure 1.7 Compustat Non-financial Firms' S&P Long-term Credit Rating 
This figure plots the time series of the number of firms and percentage of firms with S&P’s long-term A rating. A ratings include 
"A", "A+", "A-", "AA", "AA+", "AA-", and "AAA". The left axis represents the number of A rated firms and the right axis 
represents the percentage of A rated firms among all firms. 
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Figure 1.8 Commercial Paper Market Firms’ Moody’s CP Rating Composition 1991-2013 
This figure plots the time series of the number and percentage of firms with different Moody’s CP ratings. The left axis represents 
the number of firms and the right axis represents the percentage of firms. 
Panel A: Number and percentage of P-1 firms 
 
Panel B: Number and percentage of P-2 firms 
 
Panel C: Number and percentage of P-3 and below rating firms 
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Figure 1.9 DNFCP annual issuance by rating 1991-2013 
This figure plots the time series of annual average CP issuance by rating (panel A) and total CP issuance by rating (panel B).  
Panel A: CP annual average issuance by rating 
 
 
Panel B: CP annual total issuance by rating 
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Figure 1.10 Industry composition of non-financial firms among all Compustat firms 1991-2014 
This figure plots the time series of industry composition among all Compustat firms. SIC 0: 01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; SIC 1: 10-17 Mining and Construction; SIC 2 
and SIC 3: 20-39 Manufacturing; SIC 4: 40-49 Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services; SIC 5: 50-59 Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade; SIC 7 and 
SIC 8: 70-89 Services. 
Panel A: Industry composition of non-financial firms among all Compustat firms (based on firms’ total assets) 
 
Panel B: Industry composition of non-financial firms among all Compustat firms (based on number of firms) 
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Figure 1.11 DNFCP Market Industry Composition 1991-2014 
This figure plots the time series of industry composition for all firms in the DNFCP market. SIC 0: 01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; SIC 1: 10-17 Mining and Construction; 
SIC 2 and SIC 3: 20-39 Manufacturing; SIC 4: 40-49 Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services; SIC 5: 50-59 Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade; SIC 7 
and SIC 8: 70-89 Services 
 
Panel A: DNFCP market industry composition (based on firms’ total assets) 
Panel B: DNFCP market industry composition (based on number of firms) 
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Figure 1.12 Firms with last rating as P-1 or P-2 (for Group 1 and Group 2 firms) 
This figure plots the time series for the percentage of Group 1 and Group 2 firms staying or exiting the CP market (depicted on the 
right axis) and the total number of Group 1 and Group 2 firms in the DNFCP market (as depicted on the left axis). 
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Figure 1.13 Sample firms’ cash and short term investment 1991-2013 
This figure plots the time series of firms’ total cash holdings (scaled by lag total assets and depicted on the left axis) and the time 
series of the percentage of CP’s outstanding compared with cash holding as depicted on the right axis.  
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Figure 1.14 CP issuers by group from 1991 to 2013 
This figure plots the time series of the percentage of firms in each group (in Panel A) and the number of firms in each group (in 
Panel B). 
Panel A: % of firms 
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Table 1.1 Commercial paper market composition 
This table reports the CP market composition. Source of data: http://www.federalreserve.gov/.  
 Total Commercial Paper (Domestic + Foreign) 
Domestic NonFinancial 
CP / Total CP 
Domestic NonFinancial 
CP / NonFinaical CP  Financial CP NonFinancial CP
Asset-backed 
CP 
2001 41% 16% 43% 14% 90% 
2002 38% 12% 49% 11% 88% 
2003 39% 10% 51% 8% 86% 
2004 41% 9% 50% 8% 88% 
2005 41% 9% 50% 8% 88% 
2006 38% 8% 54% 6% 81% 
2007 39% 8% 53% 7% 84% 
2008 45% 11% 44% 9% 83% 
2009 46% 11% 43% 8% 71% 
2010 51% 11% 38% 8% 73% 
2011 50% 15% 35% 12% 79% 
2012 49% 19% 32% 15% 79% 
2013 52% 21% 27% 16% 75% 
Average 44% 12% 44% 10% 82% 
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Table 1.2 Moody’s short-term ratings definition 
This table reports the detailed definition of Moody’s short-term CP ratings.  
Moody's Short-Term Ratings 
P-1 Have a superior ability to repay short-term debt obligations.  
P-2 Have a strong ability to repay short-term debt obligations.  
P-3 Have an acceptable ability to repay short-term obligations.  
NP Indicate that an issuer is not sufficiently protected against the possibility of short-term default under a 
stressed scenario. 
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Table 1.3 Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of all important variables used in tests of this chapter.  
 N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
sp_rating_ave3 8222 1.4993 1.3333 0.7619 0 5 
Earnings_Vol 6987 0.0741 0.0498 0.1224 0.0073 1.5327 
M_B 7459 1.6824 1.3342 1.1748 0.4306 7.2618 
Size (as in logSales) 7903 8.6992 8.7079 1.2679 5.4036 11.6289 
Size (as in logAssets) 7931 8.7743 8.7177 1.3082 5.5668 11.8666 
ChgCapex_assets 7748 -0.003 -0.0018 0.0239 -0.1008 0.0968 
Capex_assets 7844 0.0597 0.048 0.0446 0.0061 0.2501 
Cash_assets 7903 0.0769 0.043 0.0923 0.0002 0.4988 
Inv_assets 7896 0.1159 0.0969 0.1029 0 0.4682 
allindrawn 3002 76.0105 45 77.8494 15 400 
Tangibility 7927 0.3412 0.2898 0.2174 0.0339 0.8935 
Oper_CF_assets 7889 0.1606 0.1538 0.069 0.0168 0.3718 
Leverage 7916 0.2678 0.2535 0.151 0 0.7791 
Sales_growth 7819 0.079 0.0599 0.1858 -0.4955 0.9999 
Working_Capital_wo_cash 7641 0.1486 0.1094 0.1904 -0.1687 1.0089 
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Table 1.4 Four groups of the sample 
This table presents the method of the group naming and division.  
 Last rating in P-1 or P-2 Last rating in P-3 or NP 
Firms exit the CP market 106 (Group 2) 107 (Group 3) 
Firms stay the CP market 162 (Group 1) 15 (Group4) 
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Table 1.5 Summary Statistics by Groups 
This table reports the summary statistics of all important firm characteristics by group. 
 Group 1 (N=4114)  Group 2 (N=1642)  Group 3 (N=2232)  Group 4 (N=350) 
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
sp_rating_ave3 1.2993 1  1.4412 1  1.8749 2  1.8709 2 
Earnings_Vol 0.0738 0.0507  0.0769 0.0476  0.074 0.0498  0.0543 0.0452 
M_B 1.8972 1.547  1.7201 1.3048  1.2307 1.0229  1.2587 1.1305 
Size (as in logSales) 9.0336 9.0925  8.4728 8.5221  8.291 8.1324  8.4459 8.6256 
Size (as in logAssets) 9.1051 9.1229  8.6498 8.7089  8.3172 8.1834  8.4258 8.4895 
ChgCapex_assets -0.0039 -0.0019  -0.003 -0.0027  -0.0015 -0.0014  -0.0009 -0.0013 
Capex_assets 0.0599 0.0466  0.0658 0.0567  0.0565 0.0463  0.0508 0.0407 
Cash_assets 0.0858 0.0503  0.0674 0.0331  0.0683 0.0361  0.0485 0.0252 
Inv_assets 0.1174 0.1012  0.0973 0.0792  0.1285 0.1022  0.1186 0.1008 
allindrawn 56.1251 35  70.3342 39.5  113.2543 75  92.5488 45 
Tangibility 0.3164 0.2587  0.3981 0.3559  0.3532 0.3172  0.321 0.2474 
Oper_CF_assets 0.1709 0.1657  0.1635 0.1522  0.1377 0.1308  0.1479 0.1482 
Leverage 0.2436 0.2319  0.2718 0.2656  0.3021 0.2831  0.3016 0.2897 
Sales_growth 0.0937 0.0707  0.0721 0.0555  0.0589 0.042  0.0541 0.0487 
Working_Capital_wo_cash 0.16 0.1204  0.1182 0.0738  0.1546 0.1143  0.1133 0.0813 
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Table 1.6 Comparison on Firm Characteristics 
This table reports the results of comparing the main firm characteristics between Group 1 and Group 2 and then Group 2 and Group 
3 firms by performing t-tests. *** p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1. 
  Comparison between Group 1 and Group 2 Comparison between Group 2 and Group 3 
  
Group1 Group2 Paired Difference (Group1-Group2) Group2 Group3 
Paired Difference 
(Group2-Group3) 
Size (as in logsales) 
9.0336 8.4728 0.5608*** 8.4728 8.291 0.1818*** 
Size (as in logAssets) 
9.1051 8.6498 0.4553*** 8.6498 8.3172 0.3326*** 
allindrawn 
56.1251 70.3342 -14.2092*** 70.3342 113.3 -42.92*** 
Cash_assets 
0.0858 0.0674 0.0184*** 0.0674 0.0683 -0.00091 
Capex_assets 
0.0599 0.0658 -0.00596*** 0.0658 0.0565 0.00929*** 
Inv_assets 
0.1174 0.0973 0.0201*** 0.0973 0.1285 -0.0312*** 
Sales_growth 
0.0937 0.0721 0.0216*** 0.0721 0.0589 0.0132** 
Oper_CF_assets 
0.1709 0.1635 0.00731*** 0.1635 0.1377 0.0258*** 
Leverage 
0.2436 0.2718 -0.0281*** 0.2718 0.3021 -0.0303*** 
Tangibility 
0.3164 0.3981 -0.0817*** 0.3981 0.3532 0.0448*** 
Earnings_Vol 
0.0738 0.0769 -0.00309 0.0769 0.074 0.00289 
M_B 
1.8972 1.7201 0.1771* 1.7201 1.2307 0.4893* 
Working_Capital_wo_cash 
0.16 0.1182 0.0419*** 0.1182 0.1546 -0.0364* 
WC_assets 
0.1309 0.0996 0.0313*** 0.0996 0.1334 -0.0338*** 
cp_ave 
576.5 398.2 178.3*** 398.2 213.8 184.4*** 
Free_CF 
0.1144 0.1239 -0.00952** 0.1239 0.101 0.0229*** 
Acc_payable_assets 
0.0831 0.0781 0.005** 0.0781 0.0934 -0.0153*** 
Receivables_assets 
0.1349 0.1255 0.00939*** 0.1255 0.1356 -0.0101*** 
Div_assets 
0.0246 0.0243 0.000289 0.0243 0.0166 0.00766*** 
TotalDebt_assets 
0.2436 0.2718 -0.0281*** 0.2718 0.3021 -0.0303*** 
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Table 1.7 Group 2 Firms Long-term Rating Change 1-3 Years after Exiting the CP Market 
This table reports the ratings for Group 2 firms 1-3 years after they exit the CP market.  
Panel A: Number of firms in each Long-term Rating Category 1-3 years After Firm Exits the CP Market 
 Last rating = P-1 Firms  Last rating = P-2 Firms 
S&P Firm Rating 1 year 2 years 3 years  1 year 2 years 3 years 
1 17 14 14  16 17 18 
2 4 6 6  14 14 11 
3 2 2 2  8 7 5 
4 3 4 0  5 1 2 
 
 
Panel B: Average Long-term Firm Rating 1-3 years After Firm Exits the CP Market 
  Last rating = P-1 Firms  Last rating = P-2 Firms 
  1 year 2 years 3 years   1 year 2 years 3 years 
Average S&P Firm Rating 1.19 1.23 1.23   1.58 1.69 1.66 
 
 
Panel C: % of Firm in each rating category 1-3 years after Firm Exits the CP Market 
 P-1 Firms  P-2 Firms  Both P-1 and P-2 Firms 
S&P Firm Rating 1 year 2 years 3 years   1 year 2 years 3 years   1 year 2 years 3 years 
1 65.38% 53.85% 63.64%  37.21% 43.59% 50.00%  54.10% 51.70% 55.20% 
2 15.38% 23.08% 27.27%  32.56% 35.90% 30.56%  29.50% 33.30% 29.30% 
3 7.69% 7.69% 9.09%  18.60% 17.95% 13.89%  16.40% 15.00% 12.10% 
4 11.54% 15.38% 0.00%   11.63% 2.56% 5.56%   0.00% 0.00% 3.40% 
 
 
Panel D: Definition of S&P Firm Rating 
S&P Firm Rating original S&P long-term firm rating 
1 "A", "A+", "A-", "AA", "AA+", "AA-", "AAA” 
2 BBB, "BBB+", "BBB-" 
3 BB, "BB+", "BB-", "B", "B+", "B-" 
4 CCC, "CCC+", "CCC-", "CC", "C" 
5 D, "SD" 
0 N.M.," " 
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Table 1.8 Probit Regressions for the Likelihood of CP Market Exit given prime-CP ratings 
(Prime rating sample which includes only Group 1 and Group2) 
This table shows marginal effects of probit regression predicting the likelihood of a firm exiting the CP market given that it has 
prime rating of P-1 or P-2. The dependent variable is one if a firm exits the CP market and zero otherwise. The sample only includes 
Group 1 and Group 2 firms (i.e. firms with the last rating as P-1 or P-2). *** p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1. 
parameters post-2001 pre-2001 entire sample 
sp_rating_ave3 0.1924* 0.2185* 0.1701** 
 (0.105) (0.1228) (0.0744) 
Earnings Volatility t-1 0.8755 -0.362 0.2474 
 (1.2941) (0.6214) (0.5382) 
M/B t-1 -0.097 -0.0273 -0.0873* 
 (0.0809) (0.0722) (0.0501) 
Size t-1 -0.2645*** -0.15** -0.1964*** 
 (0.0508) (0.0615) (0.0365) 
lChgCapex_assets t-1 (1.6977) -5.6964* -2.0999 
 (2.5296) (2.9426) (1.8212) 
lCapex_assets t-1 -0.4343 -8.3696*** -3.7589*** 
 (1.8569) (2.2229) (1.343) 
lCash_assets t-1 5.1881*** -1.3396 2.4549*** 
 (1.0626) (1.4154) (0.7963) 
lInv_assets t-1 -0.3125 -2.9441*** -1.4126*** 
 (0.7083) (0.8306) (0.5086) 
lallindrawn t-1 0.00219** -0.00177 0.002** 
 (0.00104) (0.00168) (0.000806) 
ltangibility t-1 0.7343** 0.9748** 0.7449*** 
 0.3569 (0.4843) (0.273) 
lOper_CF_assets t-1 0.2836 0.7016 1.2298 
 (1.1737) (1.4228) (0.8387) 
lLeverage t-1 0.9881** -0.8812 0.2665 
 (0.4188) (0.6015) (0.3204) 
lSales_growth t-1 -0.2115 -0.7997** -0.4105* 
 (0.3297) (0.3331) (0.2176) 
lWorking_Capital_wo_cash t-1 -1.9274*** 1.1832* -0.5773 
 (0.5487) (0.6722) (0.4023) 
  
R-Square 0.1199 0.1221 0.1101 
Max-rescaled R-Square 0.1969 0.1714 0.1689 
N 1090 525 1716 
No. of CP_Exit=1 195 165 379 
No. of CP_Exit=0 895 360 1337 
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Table 1.9 Comparison of Capital Structure Before / After CP Market Exits 
This table reports the results of t-tests comparing capital structure of the pre-exit and post-exit pairs of Group 2 firms (in Panel A) 
and comparing the pre-exit and post-exit pairs of Group 3 firms (in Panel A). *** p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1. 
Panel A: Key Capital Structure comparison before and after exiting the CP market for Group 2 firms 
    
Before Exit After Exit Paired Difference 
(Before - After) 
bonds (non-program, non-convertible) 0.2602 0.2196 0.0406*** 
 Public bond 0.2109 0.1215 0.0893*** 
 114A private placements bond 0.0319 0.0844 -0.0525*** 
acquisition notes 0.000668 0.00385 -0.00318*** 
    
shelf-Registered Debt 0.032 0.0116 0.0204*** 
Public bond / total debt 0.4766 0.2972 0.1794*** 
114A private placements bond / total debt 0.0419 0.1662 -0.1243*** 
acquisition notes / total debt 0.00196 0.0142 -0.0123*** 
shelf-Registered Debt / total debt 0.0603 0.0225 0.0378*** 
 
Panel B: Key Capital Structure comparison before and after exiting the CP market for Group 3 firms 
    
Before Exit After Exit Paired Difference 
(Before - After) 
bonds (non-program, non-convertible) 0.2098 0.2534 -0.0435*** 
 revenue bond 0.0059 0.00201 0.00389*** 
 114A private placements bond 0.0567 0.0931 -0.0364*** 
Bank  0.0891 0.1172 -0.0282*** 
 Term loan 0.0499 0.0783 -0.0284*** 
convertible bonds 0.0371 0.0668 -0.0297*** 
program 
debt  
0.1172 0.0508 0.0664*** 
 medium term notes 0.05 0.0171 0.0329*** 
private placements (excluding 144A) 0.0196 0.0355 -0.0159*** 
mortgage debt and equipment notes 0.00607 0.00951 -0.00345** 
subordinated debt  0.0203 0.0454 -0.0251*** 
     
secured debt / total debt 0.9618 0.9088 0.053*** 
subordinated debt / total debt 0.0382 0.0912 -0.053*** 
revenue bonds / total debt 0.013 0.00567 0.00734*** 
114A private placements bond / total debt 0.1094 0.1633 -0.0539*** 
convertible bonds / total debt 0.0809 0.1423 -0.0615*** 
program debt / total debt 0.2308 0.1198 0.111*** 
 medium term notes / total debt 0.0846 0.0406 0.044*** 
private placements / total debt 0.0439 0.0682 -0.0243*** 
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Chapter 2 
China’s Delisting Rule and Its Impact on Listed 
Companies 
2.1 Introduction 
In this paper, I asked the following question: after China’s 1998 accounting-based regulation on firm 
delisting, do Chinese loss firms take earnings management measures to improve their accounting 
performance?   
 On April 22, 1998, in order to restrain listed firms’ mismanagement, Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges announced that according to the stock listing rules, they would give special treatment to the 
stocks of listed companies with abnormal financial conditions. The abnormal financial condition refer to 
one of the following (see Javvin 2008 page 38): 
1) The net profit of listed companies were negative in two consecutive fiscal years; 
2) The per share net assets of listed companies in one recent year is lower than the face value of 
the share. 
3) There is no auditing report from an authorized accounting firm, or the accounting firm’s report.   
4) There is any abnormal financial behavior identified and claimed by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) or a Stock Exchange. 
 Based on this rule, after loss for two consecutive years, if a firm does not reverse its net profit to 
be positive, “ST” (Special Treatment) will be added before the original share name. Additionally, it will 
have very limited trading privilege on the exchanges11 and interim report will be audited. Most seriously, 
the ST status would greatly harm the firm’s reputation. If the firm fails to turn profitable in three consecutive 
fiscal years, then “PT” (Particular Transfer) will be added to its stock name. If the firm doesn’t recover loss 
for consecutive 4 years, then it will be delisted. Because of the large negative impact on firms’ reputation 
                                                     
11 The increase or decrease of ST share quotation is 5%. 
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and market liquidity, I suspect firms that receive “ST” or “PT” due to the net profit loss would have a strong 
incentive to reverse their losses.  
 Although the goal of this delisting rule is to restrain listed firms’ mismanagement, the reality is that 
CSRC and other related regulatory authorities have adopted an administrative governance approach to 
regulate China’s stock market and constantly make tradeoff between growth and control. For example, the 
administration replies on accounting numbers (e.g. ROE) to assess the readiness of IPO candidates, to 
approve listed firms of rights issue (i.e. to issue additional shares to existing shareholders), or to decide 
whether to di-list a public firm. Among all the four abnormal conditions listed above, the most important 
criterion for delisting a listed company is a reported net loss for four consecutive years (see Green 2003, 
and Pistor and Xu 2005). 
 Positive accounting theory predicts that when contracts are based on accounting numbers, 
management has an incentive to use accounting methods or other means to manipulate those numbers to 
serve the interests of the firm and/or its management (for a summary, see Watts and Zimmerman 1990). As 
in this case, I suspect that firms would have a strong incentive to change their accounting loss to profit and 
even resort to earnings manipulation or earnings management. So the question is whether the delisting rule 
really achieve what it sets out to do or whether the listed firms actually manipulate their accounting numbers 
to get around the rule.   
 Pistor and Xu (2005) documents that CSRC’s heavy reliance on accounting numbers for decision 
making unintentionally provides the listed firms with strong incentives to manage earnings above certain 
thresholds. Prior literature has also documented the rampant earnings management phenomenon in Chinese 
listed firms stimulated by CSRC’s regulations. Chen and Yuan (2004) find evidence of listed firms 
managing earnings for rights issues. Jian and Wong (2010) finds that a group-controlled firm in China is 
more likely to use related transactions to manipulate earnings and tunnel firm values. Chen et al. (2006) 
examines corporate financial frauds and find aspects of corporate governance that are associated with the 
incidence of fraud. Liu and Lu (2007) finds empirical evidence that earnings management in China is 
largely due to tunneling. 
 In this paper, I use the 1998 ST delisting mechanism used by Chinese stock exchanges as my 
identification strategy. With net profit being zero as the threshold set by the delisting rule, I employ an 
RDD (Regression-Discontinuity Design) method and analyze firms that have incurred 2 years or 3 years of 
continuous loss but some were just able to reverse their losses and those others who just missed the loss 
reversal (the so-called “borderline firms”). In particular, I examine whether the former resort to any earnings 
management measures to reverse their losses. 
 Here, I borrow the definition of earnings management from the existing accounting literature. There 
are generally two types of earnings management. One is called accrual manipulation and refers to 
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managerial intervention in the reporting process. This type of manipulation generally does not generate any 
direct cash flow consequences. Examples include under-provisioning for bad debt expenses and delaying 
asset write-offs. The other type is real activity manipulation. They are managerial intervention undertaken 
through operational decisions and deviate from normal business practices. Real activity manipulation affect 
cash flows and in some cases, accruals, too. Examples of managers manipulating real activities to avoid 
reporting annual losses include offering price discounts to temporarily increase sales, using overproduction 
to report lower cost of goods sold, and reducing discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins 
(Roychowdhury 2006). In this paper, I will examine listed firms behavior from both angles.  
 The existing literature on earnings management has also provided useful tools for my research. One 
group of papers have identified the common characteristics of firms that engage in earnings manipulations 
to be employing more income-increasing account procedures, having higher total accruals, having higher 
estimated discretionary accruals, and more likely to have a CEO who simultaneously serves as Chairman 
of the Board (e.g. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1996, Jensen, 1993). Another group of papers provide 
models and specific measures of earnings management (e.g. Jones 1991, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995, 
Roychowdhury 2006).  
 There are papers in exiting literature that have used zero earnings threshold to detect firms’ earnings 
management behavior. The results present a mix of evidence. For example, Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) found evidence of the discontinuity in frequency of firm-years around zero earnings. 
However, Dechow Dechow, Richarson and Tuna (2003) fail to find evidence that firms reporting small 
profits manage accruals to cross the zero threshold.  
 This paper contributes to the existing literature of earnings management and stock market 
management by testing whether firms, who are suspected to have strong motivation to cross an earnings 
threshold in a developing country environment, would resort to either accrual manipulation or real activity 
manipulation. 
 My research finds no evidence of borderline firms using either accrual manipulation or real activity 
manipulation to reverse their losses. Rather, contrary to my prior, firms that are just able to reverse loss in 
the third year use less non-operating net income. This is at least partially explained by the fact that the result 
is mainly driven by firms that have the least amount of losses in the second year. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some important background 
information of the Chinese stock market. Section 3 presents sample construction and empirical analysis. 
Section 4 concludes. 
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2.2 Institutional Background of China’s Listed Companies 
2.2.1. Partial privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the split share structure of 
China’s equity market 
In the late 1980’s, Chinese government initiated a privatization program in order to renovate its large and 
inefficient State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), raise revenue for the state, provide competition and build a 
capital market (see Green 2003). This is followed by the establishment of Shanghai Stock Exchange in 
1990 and Shenzhen Exchange in 1991. 
 The privatization program divided SOEs’ shares into two main categories: Tradable Shares and 
Non-tradable Shares. Tradable shares include A-shares (Chinese Yuan – dominated), B-shares, and H-
shares. Non-tradable Shares include Government Shares (which are held by the central or local 
governments), State Legal Person Shares (which are held by enterprises and in which the state is the 
majority owner), Social Legal Person Shares (which are held by domestic enterprises of which the state is 
not the controlling shareholder), Foreign Share, and Employee Share. The first two of the non-tradable 
shares together (Government Shares and State Legal Person Shares) are called State-owned Shares.  
 In the beginning, Tradable Shares are restricted to be no more than 25% of the firm’s total 
capitalization which created the split share structure of China’s equity market. When a firm went through 
IPO, only the new shares issued could be traded in the stock market and to be held by individuals and 
domestic institutions. However, since most listed firms are carve-outs or spin-offs from their parent SOEs, 
in which the original SOEs still own a large percentage of total shares of the company, the government 
(either central of local government) still controls the company. As a matter of fact, the newly listed firms 
are directly controlled by the state either through a state asset management authority or indirectly through 
a holding company. In most cases, managers of listed firms are even appointed directly by their parent 
SOEs. Before 2005, the controlling shareholders are rarely challenged by other shareholders because they 
own more than 44% of listed firms’ shares, and publicly tradable shares only account for slightly more than 
1/3rd of total outstanding shares.  
 After two immature and failed attempts in 1999 and 2001, CSRC successfully implemented Split-
Share Structure Reform of Listed Firms on September 4, 2005. With this reform in place, after a lock-up 
period, the former Non-tradable shareholders can start to gradually sell off their shares based on certain 
rules. Specifically, through consensus with discussion and approval of majority (2/3) of the Tradable 
Shareholders, Non-tradable Shareholders will compensate the Tradable Shareholders through share 
donation, payment from retained earnings, cash, partial curtailment of Non-tradable shares, etc., to gain 
more shares. By June, 2007, 93% of the 1421 listed firms in China had finished their share structure reforms. 
(Yin, 2007). 
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 See Table 2.1 for the composition of the company types in my sample. Before 1998, 60.1% of my 
sample are state-owned enterprises (including both central government and local government) and after 
1998, SOE ratio drops to 34.4% while privately-owned firms increases from 29% to 57%. My baseline 
model is based on the post-1998 sample when the delisting rule has been in effect. This is also a period 
when the state ownership does not dominate the stock market which also makes a perfect setting for 
examining the effect of state’s role on firms’ performance comparing to other forms’ of corporate 
governance. 
  
2.2.2. The Quota system 
The CSRC uses a quota system and assigns a listing quota to IPO candidates to the planning commission 
at the province level (Pistor and Xu, 2005). I suspect the existence of the quota system makes a loss firm’s 
incentive to reverse loss and stay in the stock market even stronger because once a firm is out of the stock 
market, it could be quite hard for it to get back in line for another quota in the future.   
2.3 Empirical analysis 
2.3.1. Models to detect earnings manipulation  
 Data in this paper is from the Wind Financial Terminal (WFT) provided by Wind Information Co., 
Ltd (Wind Info), headquartered in Shanghai, China. The data I have used include the annual accounting 
information and stock prices of all listed Chinese firms on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 
1990 – 2015. Final dataset consists of 2,652 firms (31,209 firm-year observation) of all non-financial 
Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 1990 – 2015 with no 
missing total asset information. Among these firms, 948 firms have occurred losses. 
 Haely and Wahlen (1999) in their review of the earnings management literature, give the following 
definition, “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.” The definition makes it clear that it is simply not what the managers do but what 
their intentions are as well that make their actions count as earnings management. For example, certain 
activities, such as delaying or acceleration of sales, or change in shipment timing (Dechow and Skinner 
2000, Haely and Wahlen 1999), if taken more than what is normal circumstances would warrant, with the 
goal of meeting certain earnings threshold, would be counted as earnings management.  
 Earnings management can be achieved by many means, such as accrual manipulation, real activity 
manipulation, changes in accounting methods, or changes in capital structure (Jones, 1991). This study 
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focuses on the first two methods, studying managerial intervention in the reporting process and through 
operational decisions, to examine loss firms’ behavior.   
 First, I follow The Modified Jones Model proposed in Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995) to 
calculate nondiscretionary accruals and examine if loss firms engage in accrual manipulation to cross the 
zero net profit threshold. Here I use the estimate of the discretionary component of total accruals as the 
measure of earnings management rather than that of a single accrual. The reason is that net profit calculation 
uses earnings that involves the effects of all accrual accounts and managers are likely to use several of them 
to increase reported earnings. As explained in Jones (1991), total accrual (TA) includes changes in working 
capital accounts, such as accounts receivable, inventory and accounts payable, which all depend to some 
extent on changes in revenues. Therefore, as in equation (2), the expectation model for calculating TA 
includes revenues (REV) as a control for economic environment of the firm. Although they are not 
completely exogenous, they are at least an objective measure of the firms’ operations before managers’ 
manipulations. Gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) is the second variable that is included in the 
model as control for the portion of total accruals related to nondiscretionary depreciation expense. Then, 
on both sides of the model, all variables are scaled by lagged assets in order to reduce heteroscedasticity. 
 The idea of using this model is that managers of loss firms would benefit from reporting positive 
net profit in the third (or fourth) year by making accounting choices that increases the reported earnings 
during the third or fourth year when earnings management are most likely to happen as compared to all the 
other years.   
 I first calculate total accruals (TA) using variables from my dataset based on formula (1). Then I 
run an OLS regression using model (2) in the “estimation period” (i.e. period in which no systematic 
earnings management is hypothesized) to generate the parameters ߙොଵ, ߙොଶ, ߙොଷ for (3). The estimation period 
for my sample includes post 1998 period excluding year 3 (or year 4) after a firm has incurred 2 years (or 
3 years) of continuous loss. I then input the OLS estimates from (2) into (3) and calculate the NDA 
(nondiscretionary accruals) in the “event period” (i.e. period when earnings management is hypothesized). 
In this case, my event period sample includes post 1998 observations that only include year 3 (or year 4) 
after a firm incurs 2 years (or 3 years) of continuous loss. Then, I calculate DA (discretionary accruals) 
using model (4). If firms have statistically significant amount of DA in loss reversal years, then it indicates 
that firms engage in earnings manipulation. Equation (5) calculates the predicted profit (or non-managed 
profit) by subtracting DA from net profit.  
 
ܶܣ௧ ൌ 	ܰ݁ݐܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௧ െ ܥܨܱ௧ (1) 
்஺೟
஺೟షభ ൌ ߙଵሺ
ଵ
஺೟షభሻ ൅ ߙଶ ቀ
∆ோா௏೟
஺೟షభ ቁ ൅ ߙଷሺ
௉௉ா೟
஺೟షభሻ ൅ ݒଵ (2) 
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ே஽஺೟
஺೟షభ ൌ ߙොଵሺ
ଵ
஺೟షభሻ ൅ ߙොଶሺ
∆ோா௏೟
஺೟షభ െ
∆ோா஼೟
஺೟షభ ሻ ൅ ߙොଷሺ
௉௉ா೟
஺೟షభሻ (3) 
ܦܣ௧ ൌ ܶܣ௧ െ ܰܦܣ௧ (4) 
ܰ݋݊ܯܽ݊ܽ݃݁݀ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௧ ൌ ܰ݁ݐܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௧ െ ܦܣ௧ (5) 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁:	ܣ௧ିଵ ൌ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௧ିଵ, ∆ܴܧ ௧ܸ ൌ ܴܧ ௧ܸ െ ܴܧ ௧ܸିଵ	, ∆ܴܧܥ௧ ൌ ܴܧܥ௧ െ ܴܧܥ௧ିଵ 
ߙଵ, ߙଶ	ܽ݊݀	ߙଷ	ܽݎ݁	ݐ݄݁	ܱܮܵ	݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁ݏ	݋݂	ߙොଵ, ߙොଶ	ܽ݊݀	ߙොଷ. 
	ܶܣ௧ ൌ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽ௧, 	ܰܦܣ௧ ൌ ܰ݋݊ܦ݅ݏܿݎ݁ݐ݅݋݊ܽݎݕܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽ௧	 
 
ܥܨܱ, ܴܧܸ, ܴܧܥ	ܽ݊݀	ܲܲܧ	stand for operating cash flow, revenues, net receivables, and gross property, 
plant and equipment respectively. Table 2.3 column (4) reports the regression coefficients for model (2). 
My results match the coefficients from Jones (1991) in signs and magnitude.    
 Next, I follow Roychowdhury (2006) to detect if loss firms engage in real activities manipulations 
to cross the zero net profit threshold. Here, I want to detect the occurrence of the following three 
manipulation activities: 1) Abnormal cash flow from operation. Cash flow from operation (CFO) refers to 
the same item as reported in the statement of cash flow. The abnormal CFO can be caused by sales 
manipulation, for example, accelerating the timing of sales and / or generating additional sales through 
increased price discounts or other credit terms; 2) Abnormal discretionary expenses. This can be achieved 
by abnormally reducing discretionary expenditures, which includes advertising expenses, R&D expenses, 
and selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses; 3) Abnormal production costs. Production costs 
(PROD) are the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) and change in inventory. The abnormal PROD can be 
caused by over production or by reporting lower COGS through increased production. Roychowdhury 
(2006) finds evidence suggesting price discounts to temporarily increase sales, overproduction to report 
lower COGS, and reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins.  
 The idea of behind using this model is that managers of loss firms would benefit from making real 
activities manipulation in order to bring their net profit to be positive in the third (or fourth) year as 
compared to all the other years.  Following is the model. 
 
஼ிை೟
஺೟షభ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺ
ଵ
஺೟షభሻ ൅ ߚଶሺ
ௌ௔௟௘௦೟
஺೟షభ ሻ ൅ ߚଷሺ
∆ௌ௔௟௘௦೟
஺೟షభ ሻ ൅ ε௧ (6) 
஽ூௌா௑௉೟
஺೟షభ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺ
ଵ
஺೟షభሻ ൅ ߚଶሺ
ௌ௔௟௘௦೟షభ
஺೟షభ ሻ ൅ ε௧ (7) 
௉ோை஽೟
஺೟షభ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺ
ଵ
஺೟షభሻ ൅ ߚଶሺ
ௌ௔௟௘௦೟
஺೟షభ ሻ ൅ ߚଷሺ
∆ௌ௔௟௘௦೟
஺೟షభ ሻ ൅ ߚସሺ
∆ௌ௔௟௘௦೟షభ
஺೟షభ ሻ ൅ ε௧ (8) 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	ܴܱܲܦ௧ ൌ 	ܥܱܩܵ௧ ൅	∆ܫܰ ௧ܸ 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁:	ܣ௧ିଵ ൌ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௧ିଵ, ∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௧ ൌ ܴܧ ௧ܸ െ ܴܧ ௧ܸିଵ 
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 I first calculate the predicted operating cash flow (CFO), production costs (PROD) and 
discretionary expenses (DISEXP) using the OLS estimates from regression results of (6), (7) and (8) which 
are run for every industry and year. Then I use the estimated coefficients to calculate the normal (or 
predicted levels. Finally, I calculate the difference between the actual values and the predicted values to get 
abnormal values for CFO, PROD and DISEXP. Table 2.3 columns (1) – (3) report the regression 
coefficients for the normal or predicted levels of CFO, PROD and DISEXP. The coefficients in my paper 
are generally as predicted by Roychowdhury (2006) in sign and magnitude. 
Additionally, among the variables firms use in calculating net profit, I examine 13 of them that are 
likely to be manipulated in order for firms to cross the zero net profit threshold: sales, COGS, sales tax, 
sales expense, administrative expense, finance expense, depreciation, P/L (Profit/Loss) in fair value change, 
P/L in investment, income tax, operating profit, total profit, and non-operating net income.  
Finally, I check 2 other variables to measure firms’ performance: EPS and diluted EPS. 
 In the following sections (sections 3.2 – 3.5), I use four different methods to examine whether the 
year 3 (after 2 years of continuous loss) or year 4 (after 3 years of continuous loss) firms engage in earnings 
management by running the following regression (9):   
௧ܻ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵܰ݁ݐ_ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚଶܶݎ݁ܽݐ௧ (9) 
௧ܻ includes total accrual from (1), discretionary accrual from (4), abnormal operating cash flow, 
abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs calculated from Roychowdhury (2006) 
model, and fifteen other variables as mentioned above (all scaled by lagged one year total assets): sales, 
COGS, sales tax , sales expense, administrative expense, finance expense, depreciation, P/L in fair value 
change, income tax, operating profit, total profit, P/L in investment, non-operating net income, EPS, and 
diluted EPS.  
 
2.3.2. Method 1 - RDD  
  I have two post-1998 samples. Sample 1 include all firms that have incurred 2 continuous years of 
loss and their net profit in the third year are within the range of median of negative net profit and median 
of positive net profit. This results 321 firms, with 225 treated and 96 untreated.  I define a firm’s treated 
status as ܶݎ݁ܽݐ ൌ 1	if	its	net_profit ൒ 0	which indicates that firm reverses loss in year 3 or year 4. 
ܶݎ݁ܽݐ ൌ 0		otherwise. Sample 2 includes all firms that have incurred 3 continuous years of loss and their 
net profit in the fourth year are within the range of median of negative net profit and median of positive net 
profit. This results 88 firms, with 54 treated and 34 untreated.  
 Because the two groups of firms’ vicinity to the zero net profit delisting (for 3 year loss sample) or 
no trading (for 2-year loss sample) threshold, they should have very similar financial characteristics. This 
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is verified by t-tests on treated and untreated firms’ main financial parameters as shown in Table 2.4. None 
of the characteristics are significantly different between the two groups of firms. 
 As indicated in Table 2.5, after running regressions model (9) for sample 1, I find that except for 
EPS and diluted EPS, none of the other tests have statistically significant results to indicate earnings 
management (only selected results are listed here). I use the same method for sample 2 and get similar 
results.   
 In summary, it is apparent that most firms that have incurred 2 years of loss reverse their losses in 
year 3 instead of year 4. This may be due to the strong negative signal the designation of “ST” sends to the 
market regarding the firms’ financial situation and this gives the firms strong incentive to reverse their loss. 
However, so far, there is no indication that firms have resorted to earnings management, either through 
earnings manipulation or real activities.  
 For the rest of the paper, I will focus on loss reversal for year 3 firms because of the very small 
sample size for year 4 firms.  
 
2.3.3. Method 2 - RDD with propensity score (PS) matching 
 Next, I use propensity score matching to create a matching sample before applying RDD method. 
Propensity Scores (PS) for treated (loss reversed) and control (not reversed) firms are calculated by 
following model (10) regression.  
ܶݎ݁ܽݐ௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߛଵܵ݅ݖ݁௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଶܼݏܿ݋ݎ݁௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଷ ே௘௧௉௥௢௙௜௧೟షభ஺೟షభ ൅ ߛସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௧ିଵ ൅ ݕ݁ܽݎ ൅ ݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜ (10) 
I match each pair of firms by choosing the minimum difference in their respective propensity scores and 
allow repeated use of control firms. This leads to 224 pairs of firms (see Table 2.6 Panel A). I then use the 
RDD method and choose only matching firms that are within the range of the median of negative net profit 
to median of positive net profit to form the full PS sample.  
Regression results for Model 9 by using this sample show that only non-operating net income and 
P/L from investment have statistically significant results (only significant results are reported). Non-
operating income measures firms’ non-operating activities. The components of non-operating income, such 
as profits from the sale of fixed assets or investments, have been shown to be tools of earnings management 
in the U.S. (e.g., Bartov 1993) and other countries, including Japan (Herrmann et al. 2003) and Singapore 
(Poitras et al. 2002). However, the coefficients on Treat for both measures (see Table 2.7 columns a and b, 
and Figure 2.1) have negative sign, which indicate that treated firms have less non-operating net income 
and less profit from investment. This implication is quite puzzling.  
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 As robustness check, I create a so-called below-mean PS sample by selecting the PS matching pairs 
that have PS difference below the sample mean (see Table 2.6 panel B) and then apply the RDD method. 
Results are similar to the PS full sample (see Table 2.7 columns c and d and Figure 2.1).  
 
2.3.4. Method 3 – Robustness check 1 - Propensity matching only 
In the first robustness check, I use the full PS sample created from section 2.3.3 without excluding any 
firms and run model 9 with the 20 different dependent variables. The result (see Table 2.8 Panel A and 
Figure 2.2 (1) – (5)) shows that treated firms have less abnormal discretionary expenses, less total profit 
but more operating profit, less depreciation, and less administrative expense.  
 When using the below-mean PS sample, the result is consistent (see Table 2.8 Panel B), except that 
this time the result also indicates that treated firms have less non-operating net income (see Figure 2.2. (6)) 
which is consistent with Method 2.  
 
2.3.5. Method 4 - Robustness check 2 - RDD with industry and year matching 
As a further check, I use year and 2 digit SIC industry code matching to create my matching pairs. Then I 
apply the RDD method by selecting only firms within the median of net profit on both sides of the zero net 
profit threshold. The result is consistent with Method 1 and 2 (see Table 2.9).  
 
2.3.6. Further discussion on Method 2 
Although there are somewhat different results from Method 1 – 4, one robust result is for non-operating net 
income. By using method 2 sample, next I explore the source of this result.  
 Based on year 2’s loss, I separate sample firms into 4 loss levels corresponding to 25, 50, 75 
percentiles and name it level 1 to 4 with level 1 as having the smallest amount of loss (scaled by beginning 
of year total assets). I expect the loss level in year 2 to have an impact on firms’ reversal in year 3. The 
results in Table 2.10 show that the reason why loss reversed firms have significantly less non-operating net 
income is mainly driven by firms that have 25 percentile of loss or less in year 2. Firms above 75 percentiles 
of loss in year 2 appear to drive the result for P/L from investment. For robustness check, I also run the test 
separating the sample into 5 loss levels based on year 2 loss. The results are similar. 
2.4 Conclusions 
 In summary, this research find no evidence of firms that are just able to reverse its loss in year 3 
using either accrual manipulation or real activity manipulation to reverse their losses. Rather, contrary to 
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my prior, the result shows that firms that are just able to reverse loss in the third year use less non-operating 
net income. This is at least partially explained by the fact that the result is mainly driven by firms that have 
the least amount of losses in the second year. Those firms likely are able to reverse their losses without 
resorting to extreme measures. 
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2.5 Tables and Figures 
Figure 2.1 Non-parametric models for post-1998 sample to test the jump at the cutoff (For RDD 
with Propensity Score Matching) 
This figure plots no-operating net income, P/L from investment on the threshold variable net profit (scaled by beginning of year 
total assets) both for the full propensity score sample and for the below mean propensity score sample). 
 
 
(1) Predicted non-operating net income on net profit (full PS 
Sample) 
(2) Predicted P/L from Investment on net profit (full PS 
Sample) 
 
  
(3) Predicted non-operating net income on net profit (Below 
mean PS Sample) 
(4) Predicted P/L from Investment on net profit (Below mean 
PS sample) 
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Figure 2.2 Non-parametric models for post-1998 sample to test the jump at the cutoff (For 
Propensity Score Matching only) 
This figure plots abnormal discretional expenses, depreciation, administrative expenses, operating profit and total profit on the 
threshold variable net profit (scaled by beginning of year total assets) for the full propensity score sample; and non-oprating net-
income on the threshold variable net profit (scaled by beginning of year total assets) for the below mean propensity score sample). 
  
(1) Predicted abnormal DISEXP on net profit (full PS Sample) (2) Predicted Depreciation on net profit (full PS sample) 
  
(3) Predicted Administrative Expenses on net profit (full PS Sample) (4) Predicted Operating Profit on net profit (full PS sample) 
  
(5) Predicted Total Profit on net profit (full PS Sample) 6) Predicted Non-operating Net Income on net profit (Below mean 
PS sample) 
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Table 2.1 Firm Types 
This tables shows the number of firms in each company type. The numbers in the brackets represent the percentages of firms in 
each column category.  
Company Type Pre-1998 Post-1998 All 
State_Central 189 343 343 
 (19.6%) (12.6%) (12.6%) 
State_Local 389 596 596 
 (40.4%) (21.9%) (21.9%) 
Private  279 1554 1554 
 (29.0%) (57.0%) (57.0%) 
Collective  53 117 117 
 (5.5%) (4.3%) (4.3%) 
Foreign 29 81 81 
 (3.0%) (3.0%) (3.0%) 
Other 23 35 35 
 (2.4%) (1.3%) (1.3%) 
total 962 2726 2726 
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Table 2.2 Number of firms based on industry 
This table shows the industry composition of the sample. 
CSRC Industry Category Number of firms 
Manufacturing 1822 
Technology 166 
Wholesale retail 156 
Energy 93 
Transportation 90 
Construction 80 
Mining 76 
Agriculture 48 
Sports and Entertainment 39 
Uncategorized 34 
Environment 31 
Comprehensive 30 
Commercial Services 26 
Science 22 
Real Estate 13 
Hospitality 11 
Health care 5 
Education 1 
Total 2743 
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Table 2.3 Model Coefficients 
This table reports the estimated coefficients for models (2), (6), (7) and (8). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
  ܥܨܱ௧/ܣ௧ିଵ  ܦ݅ݏܧݔ݌௧/ܣ௧ିଵ  ܲݎ݋݀௧/ܣ௧ିଵ  ܰܦܣ௧/ܣ௧ିଵ  
Intercept -0.0016 0.0838*** -0.0476*** 0.0273*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0057) (0.0104)  (0.0068) 
1/ܣ௧ିଵ 5.9140 *** 20.1036*** -25.4347*** 1.4538*** 
 (0.3286) (0.3328) (0.5628)  (0.3533) 
݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௧/ܣ௧ିଵ 0.0328 ***  0.8994***  
 (0.0012)  (0.0020)   
݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௧ିଵ/ܣ௧ିଵ  0.0338***    
  (0.0008)    
∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௧/ܣ௧ିଵ 0.0437 ***  -0.0229*** 0.0608*** 
 (0.0029)  (0.0045)  (0.0024) 
∆݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௧ିଵ/ܣ௧ିଵ   -0.0370***  
   (0.0036)   
ܲܲܧ௧ିଵ/ܣ௧ିଵ     -0.1046*** 
     (0.0031) 
ܴଶ 0.1360                0.2392  0.9388   0.1127  
 
  
54 
 
Table 2.4 Method 1 - Comparison of main characteristics for treated and untreated firms 
(“borderline” firms) 
This table reports the t-test results on important firm characteristics for treated firms (firms that become profitable after 2 or 3 
years of continuous of loss) and untreated firms (firms that continue to incur loss after 2 or 3 years of continuous loss) for the 
sample used in Method 1. Note: Total assets are in millions of Chinese Yuan. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Sample 1: 3 year median 
sample  
Sample 2: 4 year median 
sample  
Sample 1 robustness 
check: 3 year 25 
percentile sample 
 0 1 diff  0 1 diff  0 1 diff 
Total_assets 3,420.900 3,866.400 -445.500  1,984.800 2,371.800 -387.000  3787.7 3910.9 -123.2 
   (1426.3)    (1336.4)    (1542.5) 
ROA -0.137 -0.144 0.008  -0.183 -0.252 0.069  -0.133 -0.110 -0.024 
   (0.032)    (0.0896)    (0.0271) 
leverage 0.491 0.393 0.097  0.426 0.550 -0.124  0.551 0.371 0.180 
   (0.0744)    (0.1234)    (0.1309) 
WC_assets -0.271 -0.231 -0.040  -0.417 -0.371 -0.045  -0.276 -0.174 -0.101 
   (0.0836)    (0.1167)    (0.1184) 
Sales_assets 0.446 0.459 -0.013  0.415 0.391 0.024  0.496 0.467 0.030 
   (0.0466)    (0.1032)    (0.0731) 
Zcore -2.711 -2.265 -0.446  -4.225 -4.002 -0.223  -2.970 -1.445 -1.525 
   (0.7552)    (1.4152)    (1.0573) 
            
N 96 225     34 54     48 113   
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Table 2.5 Method 1 - RDD non-parametric model results for 3-year median sample 
This table reports selected results for model (9) ௧ܻ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵܰ݁ݐ_ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚଶܶݎ݁ܽݐ௧ with Method 1 sample. Standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
 
TA DA Ab CFO Ab PROD 
Ab 
DISEXP 
EPS 
Diluted 
EPS 
Net income/assets 0.8666*** 0.8463*** 0.3709* -0.0077 -0.2891 380.1682*** 384.5996***
 (-0.1651) (0.169) (0.2052) (0.1826) (0.2821) (-21.8793) (-22.4463) 
treat -0.0145 -0.0164 -0.0066 -0.0197 -0.0054 -6.1703*** -6.3902*** 
 (-0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0205) (0.0182) (0.0277) (-1.9943) (-2.0527) 
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Table 2.6 Method 2 - Non Parametric RDD Models with Propensity Score Matching – PS 
Comparison 
This table shows the propensity scores for treated and untreated (i.e. control) firms and their PS score difference for both the PS 
sample (Panel A) and the below-mean PS sample (Panel B). 
 
Panel A: PS sample - Estimated Probability Comparison 
 N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 90th Pctl Maximum 
ps_control 224 0.7315 0.7301 0.1705 0.1081 0.6488 0.8761 0.9341 1.0000 
ps_treat 224 0.7272 0.7311 0.1645 0.0872 0.6492 0.8731 0.9352 0.9352 
ps_diff 224 0.0079 0.0026 0.0154 0.0000 0.0012 0.0060 0.0182 0.0648 
 
 
Panel B: Below-mean PS sample - Estimated Probability Comparison 
 N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 90th Pctl Maximum 
ps_control 177 0.6956 0.6973 0.1379 0.1792 0.6320 0.7830 0.9027 0.9421 
ps_treat 177 0.6957 0.6948 0.1383 0.1767 0.6323 0.7799 0.9086 0.9352 
ps_diff 177 0.0023 0.0021 0.0017 0.0000 0.0010 0.0033 0.0044 0.0070 
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Table 2.7 Method 2 - Non Parametric RDD Models with Propensity Score Matching 
This table reports statistically significant results for model (9) ௧ܻ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵܰ݁ݐ_ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚଶܶݎ݁ܽݐ௧ with Method 2 sample. 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
  Full PS sample   Below mean-diff PS sample 
 (a) (b)  (c) (d) 
  Non-op net-income PL investment   Non-op net-income PL investment 
Intercept 0.0307*** 0.0223*** 0.0315*** 0.0224*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0066)  (0.0077) (0.0063)
net_income_assets 0.3090* 0.3397*** 0.3315** 0.3499*** 
 (0.1611) (0.1297)  (0.1579) (0.1292)
treat -0.0158* -0.0125*  -0.0183** -0.0124* 
 (0.0091) (0.0077)  (0.0091) (0.0074)
n 124  143    104  119  
 
  
58 
 
Table 2.8 Method 3 - Robustness Check 1: Propensity Matching Only 
This table reports statistically signifcant results for model (9) ௧ܻ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵܰ݁ݐ_ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚଶܶݎ݁ܽݐ௧ with Method 3 sample. 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Full PS sample 
 Ab DISEXP Total profit/assets Operating Profit/assets Depreciation/assets Expense admin/assets 
Intercept 0.01103 0.0092*** -0.0658*** 0.0300*** 0.0829*** 
 (0.01253) (0.0016) (0.0107) (0.0041) (0.0069) 
net income/assets 0.26313*** 1.0660*** 0.3520*** -0.0237 0.1019*** 
 (0.05565) (0.0067) (0.0468) (0.0177) (0.0302) 
treat -0.05643*** -0.0059*** 0.0540*** -0.0175*** -0.0334*** 
 (0.01484) (0.0019) (0.0126) (0.0049) (0.0081) 
n 282 314 295 223 295 
 
 
Panel B: Below mean-diff PS sample 
 
 
Ab DISEXP Total profit/assets
Operating 
Profit/assets Depreciation/assets
Expense 
admin/assets 
Non-op net income 
/ assets 
Intercept 0.0062 0.0077*** -0.0676*** 0.0294*** 0.0805*** 0.0259*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0016) (0.0101) (0.0044) (0.0071) (0.0050) 
net income/assets 0.2379*** 1.0593*** 0.3366*** -0.0291 0.0926*** 0.1611*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0069) (0.0486) (0.0204) (0.0343) (0.0245) 
treat -0.0526*** -0.0047** 0.0544*** -0.0163*** -0.0305*** -0.0113* 
 (0.0142) (0.0019) (0.0121) (0.0053) (0.0085) (0.0060) 
n 238 260 245 180 245 197 
 
 
  
59 
 
Table 2.9 Method 4 - Robustness Check 2: Firm Year Matching with RDD Median Sample 
This table reports statistically significant results for model (9) ௧ܻ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵܰ݁ݐ_ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚଶܶݎ݁ܽݐ௧ with Method 4 sample. 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Year and Industry Matching Sample with RDD Median 
  EPS Diluted / assets EPS / assets Non-op net income / assets
Intercept 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0264*** 
 (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00599)
net income/assets 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.2062*** 
 (0.00023) (0.00022) (0.06720)
treat -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0111
 (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00686)
n 169  174  199  
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Table 2.10 Method 2 sample loss level check 
This table reports results for model (9) ௧ܻ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵܰ݁ݐ_ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚଶܶݎ݁ܽݐ௧ by dividing Method 2 sample into 4 levels based 
on their net profit in 2nd year.  Based on year 2’s loss, sample firms are divided into 4 loss levels corresponding to 25, 50, 75 
percentiles and are named as level 1 through 4 with level 1 as having the smallest amount of loss (scaled by beginning of year total 
assets). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Panel B: Below mean PS sample 
 Non-op net income / assets  P/L investment / assets  
 (a) (b) (c) (d)  (e) (f) (g) (h) 
  level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4  level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Intercept 0.0359*** 0.0120 0.0251 0.0470*  0.0164** 0.0200 0.0165 0.0664** 
 (0.0097) (0.0204) (0.0175) (0.0251)   (0.0061) (0.0151) (0.0144) (0.0261) 
Net income / assets 0.3880** 0.4983 0.0173 0.5212   0.2376** 0.3009 0.5189 0.8648* 
 (0.1775) (0.6932) (0.5558) (0.4389)   (0.1115) (0.2852) (0.4579) (0.4554) 
treat -0.0357*** -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0291   -0.0087 -0.0077 -0.0078 -0.0593* 
 (0.0118) (0.0241) (0.0217) (0.0291)   (0.0075) (0.0169) (0.0179) (0.0301)  
  35  26 27 15   40 28 30 21  
  
Panel A: Full PS sample 
 Non-op net income / assets  P/L investment / assets  
 (a) (b) (c) (d)  (e) (f) (g) (h) 
  level 1 level2 level3 level4  level 1 level2 level3 level4 
Intercept 0.0359*** 0.0103 0.0243 0.0450  0.0166** 0.0198 0.0165 0.0677**
 (0.0088) (0.0232) (0.0170) (0.0261)  (0.0090) (0.0140) (0.0137) (0.0261)
Net income / assets 0.3875** 0.4140 -0.0214 0.4764  0.2425 0.2935 0.5207 0.8949*
 (0.1615) (0.7813) (0.5403) (0.4556)  (0.1658) (0.2629) (0.4345) (0.4535)
treat -0.0350*** 0.0052 -0.0007 -0.0201  -0.0079 -0.0089 -0.0076 -0.0603*
 (0.0105) (0.0272) (0.0210) (0.0293)  (0.0109) (0.0155) (0.0168) (0.0296)
  42 31 42 31  47 33 47 33 
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Chapter 3 
Soft Information and Internal Credit Ratings of 
Bank Loans  
3.1 Introduction 
How do banks make their loan decisions? Why do we care about it? I think the importance of examining 
the loan determinants and their effectiveness for bank decision-making lies in at least the following three 
aspects. First of all, bank is one of the major players in a country’s economy. Bank financing has been 
identified as the prime source of a firm’s external financing in all countries (Mayer 1990, Jacobson et al. 
2006). The importance of bank and its role in a country’s economy is further exemplified in the 2008 
financial crisis. Therefore, examining the inputs for banks’ ex-ante assessment of loan applications and the 
effectiveness of its loan decision making not only can help us understand banks’ behavior but also 
corporations’ financing behavior. Secondly, from the banks’ point of view, evaluating the effectiveness of 
current bank lending procedures are important for banks’ own credit risk management. As their lending 
business becomes increasingly more diverse and complex, many large banks respond by introducing more 
structured and formal credit systems and banks’ own internal rating systems are crucial inputs for such 
systems. Lastly, as for bank regulators, examining bank lending can help them determine regulatory capital 
reserve requirements and other related policies and assist government’s regulations on banks. US regulatory 
agencies already use internal ratings in their supervision of banks12. Under Basel II guidelines, qualified 
banks are even allowed to use Internal Ratings-Based Approach to calculate their regulatory capital. Thus, 
it is important to know the nature of the inputs of banks’ own rating system.  
Where does the information that banks use for their loan decisions come from then? Theory of financial 
intermediation indicates that in the process of fulfilling their “delegated monitoring” role as a bank, banks 
collect private information about the borrowers they monitor (Diamond 1984 and Fama 1985).  
                                                     
12  Rating Credit Risk: Comptroller’s Handbook: http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-
handbook/rcr.pdf. 
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 As stated by Schumpeter, “… the banker must not only know what the transaction in which he is 
asked to finance and how it is likely to turn out but he must also know the customer, his business and even 
his private habits, and get, by frequently ‘talking things over with him’ a clear picture of the situation…” 
(as cited in Diamond 1984, p. 393). 
In this paper, following existing literature, this type of non-quantitative private information that arises 
from loan officer’s interaction with her corporate clients is called “soft information”. More specifically, 
they are “information which is difficult to completely summarize in a numeric score” (Petersen 2004) and 
“information that cannot be directly verified by anyone other than the agent who produces it” (Stein 2002). 
On the other hand, “hard information” refers to quantitative information that is publicly available from 
corporate financial statements and other sources. In summary, both hard information and soft information 
can be public or private information. However, hard information is quantitative and more comparable, does 
not need to collected in person, and the collection and use of which can be done by separate people; while 
soft information is more qualitative and less comparable, needs to collected in person, and the collector and 
user of which are not separable. Financial statements, history of payment, stock returns are some examples 
of hard information; while assessment of what’s going on in the business, the industry, management’s skills, 
or other characteristics, relationship with the loan officer are examples of soft information. 
While the use of hard information is intuitive and well-documented in both the theoretical and empirical 
literature, there has only been scarce empirical support regarding the use and importance of soft information. 
In the Banking literature, researchers have long contended that loan officers use both hard and soft 
information when making corporate loan decisions. In theory, the relative importance of hard and soft 
information should depend on the types of corporate clients (e.g. large versus small, public versus private, 
etc.), types of loan contracts, accounting practices, and the legal system. However, empirically, because it 
is challenging to quantify soft information, the actual use and usefulness of soft information in practice still 
have mixed results and remains unclear.  
In this research, I study empirically whether banks indeed incorporate soft information of their 
corporate borrowers when making their commercial loan decisions, and if so, whether this improves banks’ 
loan decision making. I seek to answer these two questions in the context of one of the four largest state-
owned commercial banks in China (I will call it “the Bank” hereon) with majority of the sample being large, 
private firms. I use this setting for two reasons. One is that it provides a particularly interesting environment 
for my tests. When majority of the firms are large companies (i.e. there is ample public information 
available), is it still necessary and useful to collect and use soft information? The existing literature has 
established the importance of using relationship information for small firms and consumers on loan 
underwriting or pricing (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1994, Berger and Udell 1995, Scott 2004, Uchida, Udell 
and Yamori 2007, Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena 2008, Agarwal et al. 2010 & 2011, and Puri et al. 2012). 
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The consensus is that a bank’s information production makes the most sense where firms are the most 
opaque, have only restricted access to public securities markets and almost exclusively rely on bank 
financing and private intermediated markets. What is less obvious and largely unanswered is whether banks 
collect private information and whether such information matters for large industrial firms that are more 
transparent.  
Secondly, if soft information is used, how effective is it to be used in a bank that is controlled by the 
government? Especially some of the bank’s clients are also completely or partially owned by the 
government. Berger et al. (2005) explores a bank’s ability to act in projects that require the evaluation of 
soft information and finds that small banks are more capable of collecting and acting on soft information 
than large banks. I am going to test the collection and use of soft information not only in a large bank setting 
but rather a state-own large bank.  
The main difficulty facing research in this area is that it is challenging to quantify without details of 
loan contracts, such as the types of corporate clients, types of loan contracts, accounting practices, the legal 
system, etc. Especially, most of the research lack the necessary time-series data to trace bank’s credit 
evaluation of a loan over time. I am able to provide answer and evidence to these questions because of the 
proprietary loan database obtained from the Bank. It not only provides the details of loan contracts of all 
the loans issued by the Bank but also how the Bank’s credit status evaluation of a loan changes over time.  
Specifically, I have performed two tests. First, I test whether firms’ soft information is incorporated 
into banks’ Internal Credit Ratings (ICRs) – the ratings assigned and used by bank personnel when making 
loan decisions.  The ICRs summarize the risk of loss due to failure by a given borrower to pay as promised. 
Banks’ ICRs differ significantly from public agency’s ratings, such as Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s, in 
architecture and operating design (Treacy 1998), and the process and ratings usually are not revealed to 
outsiders. Because they are assigned by bank personnel, they can be affected by the bank personnel’s 
personal knowledge of the borrowers.  
The first empirical result shows that soft information plays an indispensable role in a bank’s ICRs, and 
banks’ loan decision making depends on both hard information and soft information. This is consistent with 
the theoretical literature on financial intermediation. For example, Diamond (1984) examines banks’ 
delegated monitoring role in which bankers incorporate both “hard” and “soft” information into their 
information production. Stein (2002) first investigates the importance of soft information in borrower-bank 
relationship by focusing on identifying differences in the use of soft information across different 
organizational setups. His model shows that a decentralized banking hierarchy is more attractive when a 
project’ soft information is to be evaluated. My result is also consistent with the scarce existing empirical 
literature directly examining this topic. For example, Liberti (2004) documents a recent trend of hardening 
of soft information and incorporating it into ICRs. However, Griffin and Tang (2012) suggests that this step 
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would be in the wrong direction by analyzing the parallel phenomenon in CDO credit ratings and showing 
that recent movement in the CDO market has made rating process more qualitative. So is it a “good idea” 
to incorporate qualitative/soft information in ICR? This seems to be largely depends on whether the 
important role of “soft” information in ICRs is a desirable or problematic feature and has been remaining 
an open question. 
This brings out my second test to empirically examine the effectiveness of soft information. In 
particular, I want to find out whether the inclusion of soft information in ICR leads to a “better” or “worse” 
prediction of the borrowing firm’s future loan default and financial health. My second result provides 
evidence that soft information has positive contribution to the Bank’s prediction of a firm’s loan 
performance and future financial health. Empirically, there are very few research directly examining the 
effectiveness of soft information in the loan decision process and there has been mixed evidence in the 
existing literature on this topic.  
First, there is evidence that effectiveness of soft information depends on the specific condition under 
which it is collected and used. Liberti and Mian (2009) find that the efficient use of soft information depends 
on hierarchical and geographical distance between the agent who collect the information and the one who 
actually uses it by evaluating a large bank in Argentina. However, their result is based on one point of time 
and not an evolution of rating changes. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) confirms that banks do collect soft 
information on borrowers but banks’ ability to collect soft information erodes with distance. Different from 
my sample of large firms, their research is focused on small, informationally opaque local bank customers.  
Secondly, there is evidence on the negative role of soft information. Nakamura and Roszbach (2013) 
finds out that when too much weight is placed on soft information, or when there is “overconfidence” of 
loan officers, it leads to an ineffective and inefficient internal credit rating system. Recent work has also 
shown that screening and monitoring quality by financial intermediaries dropped substantially in the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis (Keys et al. 2009).  
However, there are also research that has found positive role of soft information. Garcia-Appendini 
(2011) asks a similar question to mine in the setting for small business and finds that banks do use soft 
information in making lending decisions and when combining soft and hard information, the power to 
predict credit outcomes is stronger. Grunert et al. (2005) asks the similar questions by examining 4 major 
German banks. Similarly, they also find that soft information contributes to ICRs and that use of both hard 
and soft information lead to a more accurate prediction of future loan default. The major difference between 
Grunert et al. (2005) and my paper is that I also find that soft information contributes to banks’ accurate 
prediction of firms’ future financial distress; and by looking at the ICRs evolution13, I am able to evaluate 
                                                     
13 See Figure 3.1 for graphic explanation of examining the evolution of ICRs. 
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how the impact of soft information on ICRs changes over time since I have a much longer time period - 11 
years vs. 5 years, and a much larger sample size – 3,301 firms and 9,737 firm-years vs. 240 firms and 409 
firm-years. Chang et al. (2014) is the paper most close to mine. They also uses a proprietary database from 
a large Chinese state-owned bank. Not only do they find a positive contribution of soft information in 
predicting future loan defaults but also they find that soft information has a stronger prediction power than 
hard information in predicting future loan defaults for firms that have a more sustained banking relationship. 
I engage in similar methods for my tests. However, the biggest difference of my paper and Chang et al. 
(2014) is that the hard information they use in their model for loan determinants are all “pure” financial 
statement measures, while I also include an easily quantifiable relationship measure as part of the hard 
information in my base model and use alternative relationship measures in seven robustness check tests. 
Even with stronger hard information controls, I still find significant predicting power of soft information 
on future loan defaults and firms’ future financial health.  
Despite the importance of analyzing bank lending determinants for both corporate finance and banking, 
very few studies are available in the extant literature due to data limitation on commercial loan contracts – 
in both developed and emerging markets. This paper contributes to the relationship banking literature by 
filling in this gap through empirically examining the role of soft information on bank’s internal credit rating 
and its evolution over time. Furthermore, through ICR, I link soft information to the outcome of future loan 
performance and firms’ financial health. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details of the data source, variable 
definition and summary statistics. Section 3 provides the details of the two main tests and their results. 
Section 4 discuss additional tests and their results. Section 5 concludes.  
3.2 Sample Construction 
 The sample is composed of three datasets. The first one is a proprietary commercial loan database 
provided by one of the largest state-owned commercial banks (“the Bank”) in China. As can be seen in 
Table 3.1, the Bank issued around $334 billion corporate loans in a random year in the 2000s, which 
accounted for about 16% of the corporate lending in the entire Chinese domestic banking market. The loan 
database contains detailed information on all corporate loans extended by the Bank during the period of 
1999 to 2009 in five municipalities or provinces (Beijing, Liaoning, Guangdong, Shanghai, and Zhejiang). 
For each loan transaction, the database provides the identity of the borrower, the loan amount, the interest 
rate, the maturity, the collateral used to secure the loan, the proposed use of the loan, the change of credit 
status (evaluated by the Bank) over the life of the loan (the evolution of the Bank’s ICRs), the complete 
repayment history of the loan by the borrower, and other items. To my knowledge, this is the most 
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comprehensive loan database made available for academic research, including those that cover the US 
market.  
 The other two data sets are on firms accounting information. One is provided by the Bank, being 
retrieved from the Bank’s own backup accounting files used in its loan assessment process; and the other 
one is purchased from a Chinese data vendor SinoFin Financial Information Service. The SinoFin database 
provides annual financial statements for more than 200,000 Chinese companies (listed and non-listed) with 
annual sales greater than RMB 5,000,000 (approximately US $700,000 at the exchange rates of 2011) from 
1999 to 2007. In addition, it provides detailed corporate information including nature of business, legal and 
ownership structure, etc. The primary source of SinoFin data is the National Bureau of Statistics – the only 
official Chinese government agency that compiles statistical data. This is one of the most comprehensive 
and reliable data source for accounting information on Chinese companies. I build the firms’ accounting 
database by combining the information from the two accounting datasets which have both overlaps of firms 
and unique coverage not included in the other dataset. When overlaps occur, I have conducted the tests by 
using only the Bank’s data (for my baseline test), only SinoFin’s data, or an annual average of the same 
firm from both datasets (for my robustness tests).  
 Since both the Bank’s loan database and backup accounting file use the same unique identifier for 
each company, connecting these two datasets only requires matching the company identifier. However, 
connecting the Bank’s loan dataset and SinoFin’s accounting dataset require manual Chinese name 
matching. These two datasets use completely different identifying system and there are different versions 
for the same companies’ Chinese names – with characters positioned in different order, or with additional 
characters, or blank spaces placed at different spots in the name. Therefore, matching method is based on 
keywords matching in the company name, supplemented by other firm characteristics, such as company 
location, industry, phone number, firm size, and manual double checking.  
 By combining the proprietary loan database with corporations’ accounting and market data, I am 
able to evaluate the role of soft information in bank’s loan decision making. In this paper, I report the results 
from one of the five branches - Beijing14 branch from 1999-2009. All loans are based on location-dependent 
lending, which means all borrowers are located locally as the Bank branch in Beijing. The main variables 
used include identity of the borrower, the loan amount, the interest rate, the maturity, the collateral used to 
secure the loan, proposed use of loan money, ICRs over the life of the loan, and complete repayment history 
of the loan by the borrower. Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics of the resulting sample. 
 
                                                     
14 The original data set has loan data in 5 branches. The other data will be used in future work.  
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3.3 Methodology 
The Bank uses a Five-Class Internal Credit Rating (ICR) system for its loan evaluation, with 1 as the 
highest quality and 5 as the lowest. Rating 1 means “good”, while 2 “Questionable”, and 3-5 mean 
“problematic”, “loss”, and “big loss” respectively indicating there are certain deterioration in hard 
information already. In the following tests, I will focus on rating 2 because based on the detailed definitions 
of the Five-Class ICR (see Table 3.3), this is likely the time when soft information plays the most important 
role. It is also the time when loan officers seem to have a substantial subjective judgmental role.  
I also decide to convert all the loan-level ratings to annual firm-level ratings and use the latter in the 
tests. First of all, because the same firm can have different loans with different loan terms in the same year, 
it can have different loan-level ratings in the same year. Thus, the difference of the loan-level ratings may 
not necessarily be due to the firm-level information but rather the loan-level information. By aggregating 
the loan-level ratings for the same firm each year, I can minimize the noise caused by the loan level 
information. Secondly, converting to firm-ratings at annual frequency can also help me to match the 
frequency of the accounting data. For example, suppose that we have two loans -- one collateralized and 
the other one not. If the underlying hard information is similar, the first loan may get a rating 1 but the 
second one may get a rating 2. This will add noise to loans with assigned rating of 1 and thus make it more 
difficult to find significant relationship between hard information and credit ratings. On the other hand, if 
the loan-level ratings are aggregated to the firm-level and I observe a firm-level rating of 2 for any of the 
outstanding loans granted to a firm, then there must be some concerns about the financial health of the firm.  
Following are the procedures I take to assign the firm ratings.  
1) First, use the rating of the loan with the largest balance at the beginning of the year; if there are 
several loans with the same largest balance, then 
2) Use the rating that has the maximum number of loans in the year; if there are several ratings with 
the same maximum number of loans, then 
3) Use the rating that has the maximum total balance in the year; if the rating is still not unique then 
4) Use the rating of the loan with the earliest loan initiation date. 
5) Finally, keep ratings 1 and 2 and assign missing to all other ratings. 
 This results firm-level ratings being 1 or 2 or missing. Whenever a firm-level rating is missing, it 
indicates that the firm’s loan is in default status. Additionally, all the tests are conditional on that a firm has 
been granted a loan because my database does not include information on rejected loan applications. I 
windsorize all firm characteristic variables used in the tests in order to remove extreme values. I then take 
the following four steps to answer the research question.  
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3.3.1. Step 0: Pretest  
First, I perform a test to make sure the ICR system works the way it should. If it does, we should expect 
that a loan with a better rating this year to perform better next year (compared to a worse rating) and thus 
predict a lower probability of loan default and firm financial distress next year, and vice versa.  
I create two dummy variables LD (Loan Default) and FD (Financial Distress). Based on the loan rating 
definitions and their corresponding probability of default (as shown in Table 3.3), LD takes the value of 1 
when ICR is in 3-5. Otherwise, LD takes the value of 0. The reason why I define loan default this way is 
because by the Bank's internal standard, a rating of 3, 4, or 5 means a bad loan. After a loan turns bad, the 
Bank may be engaged in renegotiation with the borrower and this may delay the actual loan defaults 
recorded by the bank but in fact the loan is already a bad loan.  
 
ܮܦ௧ ൌ 1, ݓ݄݁݊	ܫܥܴ௧ ൌ ሺ3,4,5ሻ 
ܮܦ௧ ൌ 0, ܱݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ 
 
A firm is in financial distress when it has difficulty paying off its financial obligations to its creditors. 
Thus FD is defined as the following:  
 
ܨܦ௧ ൌ 0,ݓ݄݁݊	 ܧܤܫ ሺܶா௡ௗି௢௙ି௒௘௔௥ሻ௧ ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ	ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐሺா௡௧௜௥௘	௒௘௔௥ሻ௧⁄ ൒ 1 
ܨܦ௧ ൌ 1, ܱݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ 
 
I test whether rating 2 (i.e. a worse rating) has a stronger predictive power for LD=1 (loan default) and 
FD=1 (financial distress) than rating 1 (i.e. a better rating). I expect to see that loans with rating 2 this year 
predict next year’s loan default and firm financial distress with a higher probability than those with rating 
1. Thus, I design the pretest as the following probit regressions: 
 
ܲሺܮܦ௧ሻ ൌ ܴ2௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜ (1) 
ܲሺܨܦ௧ሻ ൌ ܴ2௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜  (2) 
 
 Here, at-1 and bi are time and industry fixed effects, and R2, LD, and FD are all dummy variables. 
R2 stands for rating 2 and takes the value of 1 when firm rating is 2 and 0 when firm rating is 1. LD and 
FD stands for loan default and financial distress respectively and are defined as above.  
 The result (as in Table 3.3) shows that a worse rating (rating 2) does predict loan default and firm’s 
financial distress with a higher probability than a better rating (rating 1) in the following year and the 
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difference is statistically significant at 1% level. This means the current ICR system does work the way it 
is design for. Next, I am going to explore the inputs to the ICR system and see if it includes the soft 
information.  
 
3.3.2. Step1: Test 1 
First, I want to verify that hard information does contribute to the ICR system. The test is specified as 
the following probit regression:  
ܲሺܴ2௧ሻ ൌ ܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜  (3) 
 Here I test the probability of getting loan rating of 2 versus 1. The reason why I want to compare 
rating 2 with rating 1 is because I think rating 2 is when the loan officer can exercise the most subjective 
judgment in the loan decision making process. As shown in Table 3.3, ICR 1 are considered “good” loans, 
ICR 3-5 are considered “bad” loans, while ICR 2 is the transitional and the most unstable rating and thus is 
when soft information plays the most important role. As the definition for rating 2 says, when rating 2 is 
given, it means “…there exist factors that may have negative impact on the borrower's ability to repay the 
loan.” I suspect that loan officers need to use substantial judgment when deciding whether the quality of a 
loan has improved, declined or remained the same when assigning rating 2 to it.   
 Here for equation (3), again the dependent variable R2 equals to 1 when firm rating takes the value 
of 2, and equals to 0 when firm rating takes the value of 1, and at-1 and bi are time and industry fixed effects.  
Here, Xt-1 represents firm’s hard information. I include an extensive set of variables for the hard information. 
Specifically, I include size which is the log value of firm’s total assets. Next, I include Z-score which is a 
linear combination of four or five common business ratios on firms’ liquidity (T1), profitability (T2 and 
T5), productivity (T3), and leverage (T4), weighed by coefficients, for predicting firms’ future bankruptcy. 
It was first published by Edward I. Altman in 1968 and thus also called Altman’s Z-score. I use two versions 
of Altman’s Z-score in the baseline model and robustness check model respectively: Z-score1 is Altman’s 
Z-score estimated for US private firms (Altman 2000), and Z-score2 is Altman’s China Z-score for listed 
firms (Altman et al. 2007). My sample is composed of large Chinese firms and are composed of both listed 
and non-listed firms (with majority as unlisted firms), so both Z-scores are close approximations for my 
needs and give similar results. Following are details of the calculation and definitions of the two Z-scores.  
 
ܼ െ ݏܿ݋ݎ݁115 ൌ 0.717 ∗ T1	 ൅ 0.847 ∗ T2 ൅ 3.107 ∗ T3 ൅ 0.420 ∗ T4 ൅ 0.998 ∗ T5 
ܼ െ ݏܿ݋ݎ݁216 ൌ 0.517 ൅ 0.388 ∗ T1 ൅ 1.158 ∗ T2 ൅ 9.320 ∗ T3 െ 0.460 ∗ T4_1 
                                                     
15 Altman’s Z-score estimated for US private firms (Altman 2000) 
16 Altman China Z-score - listed firms (Altman et al. 2007) 
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T1 = (Current Assets-Current Liabilities) / Total Assets = Working Capital/Total Assets (Liquidity 
measure) 
T2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets  (Profitability measure) 
T3 = EBIT / Total Assets (Productivity measure) 
T4 = Book Value of Equity / Total Liabilities (Leverage measure) 
T5 = Sales/ Total Assets – capital turnover ratio (TurnOver: Profitability measure) 
T4_1=total liability / total assets (Leverage measure - reciprocal of T4) 
 
  I then included a group of dummy variables: FD17 takes the value of 1 when firm is in financial 
distress and 0 otherwise; ld_io  takes the value 1 when firm has loan default18 or interest overdue19 in the 
year and 0 otherwise; state_own takes the value of 1 when a firm is state owned and 0 otherwise; 
emphasis takes the value of 1 when the Bank regards the customer as important to it and 0 otherwise20. 
Finally, I include four relationship measures and four corresponding dummies with the first being used in 
my base model and the rest in robustness check models. The relationship measures include log of length 
of bank and firm relationship (in number of years), log of number of loans (that have been issued from the 
Bank to the firm), log of average loan size (for all the loans that have been issued from the Bank to the 
firm), log of total loan size (for all the loans that have been issued from the Bank to the firm), whether the 
previous business relationship between the Bank and firm measured in years is at least at the mean sample 
level (dummy), whether the number of loans that have been issued from the Bank to the firm is at least at 
the mean sample level (dummy), whether the average loan amount is at least at the mean sample level 
(dummy), and lastly whether the total loan amount is at least at the mean sample level (dummy). All 
explanatory variables are measured in the year before (lag value), unless stated otherwise. Detailed 
definition and calculations of the variables are included in Table 3.15.  
 I present the result of the baseline model in Table 3.5 column 1. My results verified that hard 
information is indeed important in determining ICRs. In particular, size, z-score, firms’ past financial 
distress, and past relationship with the bank all significantly impact firms’ probability of getting loan rating 
of 2 versus 1. In particular, when a firm’s size is small, financial health is poor and has past occurrence of 
financial default, there is a higher probability of it getting a rating 2 vs. 1. When a firm has a longer 
relationship with the bank, it is also more likely to get a rating of 2 vs. 1. This can be understood as the 
following. When a firm has a long relationship with the bank, bank would be able to collect more soft 
                                                     
17 Definition of FD is the same as in Section 3.3.1. 
18 Loan default is defined as when firms’ ICR takes the value of 3, 4, or 5, the same as in Section 3.3.1.  
19 Interest overdue information is obtained from an interest overdue flag from the loan database.  
20 This value is taken directly from the variable “emphasis flag” from the loan database which is an indicator of the importance of 
the customer to the bank. 
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information on the firm, thus be more informative with the inner works of the firm and more sensitive with 
any negative indicator of the firm. I also notice that emphasis flag doesn’t show statistical significance. 
This can be interpreted as that past credit payment does not seem to be important when soft information is 
considered which is consistent with findings in Garcia-Appendini (2011).  
 I further conduct robustness checks and present the results in Table 3.5 columns 2-11. Here, I use 
several alternative z-score measures to replace z-score1 (i.e. z-score2 and average of 1-year and 2-year lag 
values for both z-scores21) and use alternative measures for lender-borrower relationship. Firm size, z-score 
and financial distress indicator continue to show similar magnitude and statistical significant as in the base 
model (model 1), while bank-firm relationship measures vary.  
 I also find some suggestive results regarding state ownership. State ownership does not show a 
consistent sign. For example, in model 5, when I use the average amount of loans as the relationship 
measure, the state ownership variable is significantly positive, which means that when a firm is state owned, 
there is a higher probability that it is going to get a rating 2 versus 1. However, the state ownership variable 
loses its significance in model 1, when we measure the past relationship with the number of bank-firm years. 
This could mean that compared with average loan amount, number of years is a much stronger measure of 
lender-borrower relationship. When number of years enter the test, it dominates the relationship. The longer 
the relationship, the more internal information the loan officer gathers about the firm and the more sensitive 
the loan officer becomes to the negative information of the firm, which lead to a higher probability for the 
firm to get a lower rating. I also notice that, in model 5, when only average amount loan enters the test as 
the relationship measure, it gives us a significant negative sign. This shows that compared to a non-state 
owned firm which has a larger average loan size from the Bank, a state-owned firm with a smaller average 
loan amount will have a higher probability of getting the worse rating 2 versus the better rating 1.  
 Z-score is a comprehensive measure of a firm’s general health. If I break it down to its five 
components, namely the liquidity, profitability, productivity, leverage (reciprocal of leverage) and 
profitability measures (T1-T5) and rerun the models above, I should be able to see how each component in 
the z-score is impacting the probability of firm receiving loan rating 2 versus 1. As shown in Table 3.6, 
these further robustness checks show similar results for firm size and past financial distress as in Table 3.5. 
However, now I am able to “peek inside” the z-scores. I find that when a firm’s productivity (T3) is lower 
and leverage (T4) is higher, there is a higher probability of firm getting a loan rating of 2 verses 1 and the 
results are statistically significant.  
 
                                                     
21 Refer to definition and calculation in Table 3.15. 
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3.3.3. Step2: Test 2 
Next, I want to find evidence on whether soft information is included in ICR.  
In this step, I match firms with rating 1 and those with rating 2 based on firm characteristics as identified 
in Section 3.3.2 Test 1. First, I calculate rating 1 and rating 2 firms’ Propensity Scores (PS) by using the 
following probit model. 
 
ܲሺݎܽݐ݅݊݃௧ିଵሻ ൌ ݏ݅ݖ݁௧ିଵ ൅ ܼݏܿ݋ݎ݁௧ିଵ ൅ ܨܦ௧ିଵ ൅ ܮܦ_ܫܱ௧ିଵ ൅ ݏݐܽݐ݁_ܱݓ݊௧ିଵ ൅ ݁݉݌݄ܽݏ݅ݏ௧ିଵ ൅
݊ݑ݉_ݕ݁ܽݎݏ௣௥௘ ൅ ܽ௧ ൅ ܾ௜     (4) 
 
Then, I create matching pairs of rating 1 and rating 2 firms based on the same year, the same industry 
(based on SIC code) and similar propensity scores (within 10% of PS without replacement) and end up with 
3643 pairs of matched firms. As can be seen in Table 3.7, the two groups’ PS are very similar with the 
mean difference being 3 basis points and maximum difference being 183 basis points. Table 3.8 shows the 
summary statistics of key characteristics of these two groups of firms. Again, these two groups look very 
similar in all these main firm characteristics that I consider as key inputs for the Bank’s ICR hard 
information.  
In order to address the concern of the bias generated by unobservable confounding factors, I have used 
the following approaches. For the basic PS matching as stated above, I use an extensive list of hard 
information variables based on the literature in order to reduce as much bias as possible. In addition, I use 
different matching methods for robustness checks and get similar results:  
1) I match rating 1 and rating 2 firms with PS above the mean only and end up with 2078 matched 
pairs; 
2) I match firms on same year, same industry, and similar lag 1 year Z-scores; 
3) I match firms on year, industry and other models of PS (using different z-scores and different 
relationship measures to replace num_years).   
Both 2) and 3) also lead to substantial set of matched firms.  
This naturally raises a question – why would these two matched group of firms with very similar firm 
financial characteristics get assigned different ratings? This suggests that the Bank must have incorporated 
factors other than the available hard information in their ratings. I consider this as strong evidence of the 
Bank incorporating soft information in its ICR system.  
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3.3.4. Step3: Test 3 
 Now that I have found evidence showing that soft information is used in ICR, in this test, I want to 
examine the usefulness of soft information as used in the ICR system. In particular, I will explore whether 
the addition of soft information leads to a “better” or “worse” evaluation of future loan performance and 
firms’ financial health by examining how previous ratings (2 vs. 1) predict future loan default (i.e. ICR 
being 3, 4 or 5) and financial distress (EBIT/Interest <1).  
 On the one hand, I expect the use of soft information by the Bank to improve the information 
content of the internal credit rating, relative to what can be gauged from hard information alone. Thus, if 
the internal rating is sensible, I would expect the internal credit rating to do better than publicly available 
measures in predicting ultimate loan performance and see a stronger prediction power of loan default and 
financial distress if the previous rating is 2 vs. 1. However, on the other hand, because the Bank is controlled 
by the government, political influence and bureaucracy can potentially distort the hard to be quantified 
information component in the rating system.  
 I use the matched sample from test 2 to run the following two probit regressions: probability of 
future loan default on firms’ ratings and probability of future firm financial distress on firms’ ratings.  
 
ܲሺܮܦ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ܴ2௧ ൅ ܽ௧ ൅ ܾ௜ (5) 
ܲሺܨܦ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ܴ2௧ ൅ ܽ௧ ൅ ܾ௜  (6) 
 
 Here, definitions of R2, LD and FD are all the same as in Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.   
 The result, as presented in Table 3.9, shows that for either the matched PS sample or the above-
mean PS matched sample, rating 2 has a statistically significant higher predicting power than rating 1 in 
predicting future loan default and firm’s future financial distress. Specifically, for the baseline model (by 
using the matched sample), I find that when loan rating changes from 1 to 2, probability of loan default 
increases by 73% and probability of financial distress increases by 61%. For the robustness check, using 
the smaller set of above-mean matched sample, my result still shows that when loan rating changes from 1 
to 2, probability of loan default increases by 64% and probability of financial distress increases by 59%. 
This demonstrates that despite the government’s influence, the big Chinese bank has a very efficient loan 
evaluation system! 
 In summary, soft information has proven to be a useful component in ICR. It helps improve the 
prediction of future loan default by 64% - 73% and helps improve prediction of firms’ future financial 
distress by 59% - 61% when compared with using hard information alone. 
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3.4 Additional Tests and Robustness Checks 
 In 2005, there was an important reform in the Bank which lead to a revolutionary change in its ICR 
system. Following I am going to test the impact of this reform on the Bank’s ICR system.  
 
3.4.1. Rollover Test 
 In the following test, I look at both Beijing and Guangdong branches and test whether 2005 reform 
leads to any changes in the rating outcomes. In the dataset, there is a special loan indicator for rollover 
loans. As shown in the descriptive statistics of these two samples in Table 3.10, the percentage of rollover 
loans that defaulted or firms that become financially distressed are much lower for post-2005 period 
compared with the pre-2005 period.  
 Following the probit regression model in (7), I test whether the Bank changes its criteria in granting 
rollover loans after the reform.   
 
ܲሺܴ݋݈݈݋ݒ݁ݎ௧ሻ ൌ ܺ′௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜  (7) 
 
 The result, as presented in Table 3.11, show that in general, it is less likely to get rollover loans 
after 2005. The characteristics of firms that received “rollover” loans also changed over time. Firms with 
lower profit are more likely to receive rollover loans in the post-2005 period. Firms that have past financial 
distress, lower leverage, lower capital turnover (for Beijing sample) or lower productivity (for Guangdong 
sample) are more likely to get rollover loans and these characteristics do not significantly change before 
and after the 2005 reform.  
 While the other factors are intuitive, why would firms that have experienced past financial distress 
and lower profit have a higher probability of rolling over their loans? I suspect the reason could be that the 
ratings after the reform were artificially inflated. The Bank may have intentionally used rollover loans to 
reduce the loan default rates.  
 
3.4.2. Revised Test 1 
 Similar to Section 3.3.2 Test 1, following model (8), I run probit regression to test the likelihood 
getting rating 2 vs. 1 on firms’ hard information in two time periods - before 2005 and after 2005 in order 
to test whether there is any change in the prediction power of hard information on ICRs before and after 
the reform. However, this time, I use the propensity matching sample for the test. Other than the original 
PS matching sample without replacement, I also create a PS matching sample with replacement. The hard 
information includes size, FD, and five breakdown components of Z-score1.  
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ܲሺܴ2௧ሻ ൌ ܺ′௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜  (8) 
 
 The results are presented in Table 3.12. For the Beijing sample of post-2005 period, consistent with 
my earlier result, when firm has small size, has past occurrence of financial default, has a low productivity 
and high leverage, there is a higher probability of it getting a loan rating of 2 verses 1 and the results are 
statistically significant. However, the pre-2005 period sample shows no statistical significance on past 
occurrence of financial default. It appears that 2005 reform has improved the prediction power and accuracy 
of hard information for the Beijing branch.  
 The Guandong branch has similar result for the post-2005 sample as Beijing. Except for Guangdong, 
higher capital turnover and higher productivity factors can also increase the probability of getting rating 2 
vs. 1. This could be because these two factors can be associated with a smaller firm and smaller firms have 
a higher probability of getting rating 2 vs. 1. Guangdong sample does have a consistent prediction power 
from past financial distress for both the pre-2005 and post-2005 sample. In my future research, I will 
conduct test to find out whether this difference is due to the different political environment in Guangdong 
and Beijing. In another word, I suspect that Guandong provides an environment with less political influence 
on both the Bank and firms and thus Guangdong branch’s ICRs have less noise than Beijing’s which were 
contaminated because of the political environment until after the 2005 reform.   
 As a robustness test, I run the same test only on firms in the biggest industry in my sample – 
manufacturing industry. Results are similar and are presented in Table 3.13. 
 
3.4.3. Revised Test 3 
 Now that we know the rating system appears to have improved after 2005 reform, I will continue 
the tests on the prediction of soft information on future loan default and finance distress by following model 
(9) and (10). I conduct this test on Beijing sample with different specifications of the model and present the 
results in Table 3.14. 
 
ܲሺܮܦ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ܴ2௧	൅	ܴ2௧ ∗ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ܽ௧ ൅ ܾ௜ (9) 
ܲሺܨܦ௧ାଵሻ ൌ ܴ2௧	൅	ܴ2௧ ∗ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ܽ௧ ൅ ܾ௜  (10) 
 
 Here post takes the value of 1 if time is after 2005 and 0 if it is before 2005. The coefficient I am 
most interested in is 	ܴ2௧ ∗ ݌݋ݏݐ. The results indicate that, in general, the ICRs’ prediction power for future 
loan default increased significantly after 2005 but the impact on financial distress is unclear.  
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 In summary, it seems that 2005 reform has improved the Bank’s ICR system. However, when 
combining the rollover results and the fact that only the prediction power of loan default has improved and 
not financial distress, which is a cleaner and less manipulative measure of a firm’s health, this seemingly 
improvement could be man-made. More tests need to be done in order to find out the true effect of the 
reform.  
3.5 Analysis and Conclusion 
  My test results show that soft information has real impact on banks’ loan decision making. ICRs 
depends on both hard information and soft information. Soft information plays an indispensable role in a 
bank’s ICRs. In order to understand ICR, we must understand the use of soft information. Soft information 
or hardening of soft information should be a factor to consider in determining bank regulations. Furthermore, 
as an integral component of ICR, soft information not only helps to predict future loan default and but also 
a firm’s financial distress. This study verifies the positive role of soft information in credit evaluation.  
 In future work, I will continue the work on soft information’s real pricing impact by looking at 
specific loan terms. For example, I will focus on a subset of firms that have history of past financial distress 
and examine when their financial situation improves, whether their ICRs get upgraded. If it is the case, 
whether this lead to a real change in loan terms. Theoretically, this can go either way which leaves it to be 
an interesting empirical question. My hypotheses are: a) banks do not have incentives to improve loan terms 
for the firms. Thus, they will only downgrade an ICR instead of upgrading it; and b) banks will improve 
loan terms for the firms due to the consideration of long-term relationship or cross-selling.  
 I will also further enjoy the richness of the dataset by looking at bank branches in other provinces 
to explore the differences under different political environment.  
 I may also investigate the role of political connections on bank decisions. Political connections are 
likely to be especially important in countries where investor protection and corporate governance are weak. 
The banking industry in China provides an ideal environment to examine this issue, due to the historical 
influence of the government on bank’s lending practices and the slow pace of reform in the banking industry.  
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3.6 Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The Bank’s ICR Evolution 
This figure depicts that a loan is ininiated at time T1 and is assigned an initial rating ICR0 with both hard and soft information as 
input. Then at some point of time T2, or at multiple times before loan matures (T2, …) , the Bank may re-evaluate the firm’s credit 
and adjust its rating to ICR1, (ICR2,… ), again with hard and soft informaiton as input. At time TM, loan matures with an ending 
rating ICRM. By examining the ICR evolution over time, I mean examiming ICR0, ICR1, ICR2,… ICRM. 
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Table 3.1 Key Financial Variables of “the Bank” 
Note: Due to confidentiality, the identity of the Bank cannot be released. Thus here I only report selected financial variables for a 
random year vs. a specific year.  *Market refers to domestic banking market. 
  A random year after 2000 Market Share* (%) 
Deposits ($billion) 693.1 20 
 Corporate deposits ($billion) 317.7 23 
 Savings deposits ($billion) 375.5 22 
Loans ($billion) 397.5 17 
 Corporate loans ($billion) 333.7 16 
 Personal loans ($billion) 63.7 24 
Total assets ($billion) 780.0 17 
#  corporate customers (million) 2.5  
# individual loan customers(million) 3.93  
 
 
  
79 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Note: This table reports the mean value of firm-specific variables over the sample period of 1999-2009.  
Panel A: Main Characteristics of the Sample 
Variables Values Unit 
Num customer_years                     9,737   
Num customers                     3,301   
Num loans                  41,520   
Num contract                  39,010   
Average monthly repayment                       0.02  (in billion RMB)  
Total loan amount               3,273.43  (in billion RMB)  
Average loan amount                       0.08  (in m RMB)  
Average contact maturity                     11.01  (in months) 
Average actual maturity                       8.85  (in months) 
Average ROA                       0.07   
Average size                     61.37  (in m RMB)  
Average long-term leverage                       0.07   
Average total leverage                       0.66   
Average EBIT                       2.54  (in m RMB)  
 
 
Panel B: Industry Composition of the Sample 
Industry Number of firms percentage of firms 
manufacturing 2165 38.2% 
real estate 485 8.6% 
farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 52 0.9% 
architecture/construction 130 2.3% 
transportation and shipping industry 141 2.5% 
wholesale and retail industry 1635 28.9% 
lodging, food and beverage industry 147 2.6% 
other 906 16.0% 
total 5661  
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Table 3.3 Five-Class Internal Credit Rating (ICR) 
This table reports the detailed definition of the ICR used by the Bank. 
Rating Definition Probability of Default
1 Good 0 
  
Borrower has the ability to follow the contract; No sufficient reason to suspect that the loan 
cannot be repaid on time and in full amount.   
2 Questionable / Watch >0 
  
Although the borrower currently has the ability to pay the principle + interest in full amount, 
there EXIST factors that may have negative impact on the borrower's ability to repay the loan.   
3 Problematic 20% 
  
Borrower CANNOT REPAY principle + interest JUST based on the firm's normal operating 
income. Even if there is collateral, there is a still a HIGH PROBABILITY OF LOSS to the 
Bank.   
4 Loss 50% 
  
Borrower CANNOT REPAY principle + interest. Even if there is collateral, the Bank is 
CERTAIN to incur a RELATIVELY BIG LOSS.   
5 Big Loss 80% 
  
After the Bank resorts to all possible measures and legal procedures, borrower still CANNOT 
REPAY principle + interest, or only a very small portion can be repaid - BIG LOSS.   
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Table 3.4 Pretest: Probit Regressions for the Likelihood of Loan Default and Financial Distress 
This table shows marginal effects of probit regressions predicting the likelihood of a firm having a loan default or financial distress. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is one if a firm has a loan default for that year and zero otherwise. It follows the model: 
ܲሺܮܦ௧ሻ ൌ ܴ2௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜. The dependent variable in column (2) is one if a firm experience financial distress for that year and 
zero otherwise. It follows the model: ܲሺܨܦ௧ሻ ൌ ܴ2௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜. at-1 and bi are time and industry fixed effects; and R2, LD, and 
FD are all dummy variables. R2 stands for rating 2, and R2 =1 when ICR = 2, and R2 = 0 when ICR = 1. LD stands for loan default, 
and LD = 1 when ICR = (3, 4 or 5), and LD = 0 when ICR = (1 or 2). FD stands for financial distress and it is calculated as ܨܦ௧ ൌ
0,ݓ݄݁݊	 ܧܤܫ ሺܶா௡ௗି௢௙ି௒௘௔௥ሻ௧ ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ	ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐሺா௡௧௜௥௘	௒௘௔௥ሻ௧⁄ ൒ 1; and ܨܦ௧ ൌ 1, ܱݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁. Tests are done with both year and 
industry fixed effects. The intercepts are not reported. Robustness standard errors are clustered at the customer level and reported 
in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  
(1) 
LDt  
(2) 
FDt 
R2t-1 0.4506*** 0.3627*** 
(2 vs.1) (0.0449) (0.0451) 
   
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
# of rating1s 962 1046 
# of rating 0s 5538 5454 
# of firm-years 6500 6500 
# of firms 2115 2115 
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Table 3.5 Test 1: Probit Regressions for the Likelihood of Getting Loan Rating of 2 vs. 1 
This table shows marginal effects of probit regressions predicting the likelihood of a firm getting loan rating of 2 versus 1. The dependent variable is one if the firm’s ICR takes the 
value of 2, and takes the value zero if the firm’s ICR takes the value of 1. It follows the model: ܲሺܴ2௧ሻ ൌ ܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜. at-1 and bi are time and industry fixed effects, and Xt-1 
represents firm’s hard information, the definition of which is in Table 1.5. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
lsize -0.2394*** -0.2441*** -0.2795*** -0.2598*** -0.1863*** -0.217*** -0.3657*** -0.2473*** -0.2249*** -0.2362*** -0.2243***
 (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0181) (0.0176) (0.0255) (0.0201) (0.0266) (0.0185) (0.0174) (0.0172) (0.0173) 
lzscore1 -0.0815*** -0.087*** -0.0905*** -0.0944*** -0.0967*** -0.0967*** -0.0944*** -0.0967***    
 (0.02) (0.0188) (0.0209) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0203) (0.0196)    
lzscore2         -0.1337***   
         (0.0303)   
lzscore1 ave          -0.0855***  
          (0.0184)  
lzscore2 ave           -0.1387*** 
           (0.0325) 
lfd 0.3423*** 0.3564*** 0.3193*** 0.3515*** 0.387*** 0.3782*** 0.3138*** 0.3704*** 0.3444*** 0.3446*** 0.3422*** 
 (0.0575) (0.0571) (0.0573) (0.0568) (0.0571) (0.057) (0.057) (0.0568) (0.057) (0.0573) (0.0571) 
lld lio 0.1016* -0.00359 0.0462 -0.0056 -0.0051 -0.0046 0.012 -0.012 0.1112* 0.1038* 0.1146* 
 (0.0596) (0.0591) (0.0554) (0.0579) (0.059) (0.0592) (0.0569) (0.0587) (0.0597) (0.0595) (0.0595) 
lstate own2 0.0563 0.1288** 0.0794 0.1542*** 0.1586*** 0.1775*** 0.158*** 0.1734*** 0.0438 0.0559 0.0442 
 (0.0588) (0.0574) (0.0589) (0.057) (0.057) (0.0566) (0.0571) (0.0567) (0.0592) (0.0585) (0.0589) 
lemphasis -0.0246 0.0219 -0.0559 0.0073 0.0618 0.0537 -0.0355 0.0418 -0.0353 -0.0351 -0.041 
 (0.0846) (0.0833) (0.0865) (0.0844) (0.0829) (0.0826) (0.0851) (0.0826) (0.085) (0.0838) (0.0843) 
num years pre 0.4596***        0.469*** 0.4615*** 0.4701*** 
 (0.0421)        (0.043) (0.0419) (0.0425) 
num years dummy  0.4464***          
  (0.0635)          
num loans pre   0.2906***         
   (0.0319)         
num loans dummy    0.3284***        
    (0.0664)        
ave loan pre     -0.0859***       
     (0.0331)       
ave loan dummy      -0.161*      
      (0.0883)      
total loan pre       0.1698***     
       (0.0269)     
total loan dummy        0.0909    
        (0.0852)    
            
N 6377 6377 6377 6377 6377 6377 6377 6377 6378 6414 6414 
N-cluster 1785 1785 1785 1785 1785 1785 1785 1785 1785 1790 1790 
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Table 3.6 Robustness check for Step 1: Test 1 (Probability of getting loan rating of 2 vs. 1) 
This table shows marginal effects of probit regressions predicting the likelihood of a firm getting loan rating of 2 versus 1. The dependent variable is one if the firm’s ICR takes the 
value of 2, and takes the value zero if the firm’s ICR takes the value of 1. It follows the model: ܲሺܴ2௧ሻ ൌ ܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜. at-1 and bi are time and industry fixed effects, and Xt-1 
represents firm’s hard information, the definition of which is in Table 3.15. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lsize -0.2335*** -0.1774*** -0.2293*** -0.1804*** lsize -0.2329*** -0.1778*** -0.2284*** -0.1781*** 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.0176) (0.0264)  (0.0178) (0.0256) (0.0175) (0.026) 
lT1 -0.0421 -0.0674 -0.1216 -0.183* lT1_ave -0.1092 -0.1287 -0.1976* -0.258** 
 (0.1042) (0.1055) (0.1051) (0.1039)  (0.115) (0.1154) (0.1179) (0.1152) 
lT2 -0.0278 0.0037 -0.0945 -0.0849 lT2_ave 0.1307 0.149 0.0673 0.0594 
 (0.15) (0.1452) (0.1478) (0.145)  (0.1461) (0.1442) (0.1491) (0.1487) 
lT3 -1.3945*** -1.602*** -1.5915*** -1.8736*** lT3_ave -1.7147*** -1.9543*** -1.9272*** -2.2309*** 
 (0.3845) (0.3935) (0.3783) (0.3814)  (0.4760) (0.488) (0.4573) (0.4683) 
lT4 -0.0462** -0.056***   lT4_ave -0.0551*** -0.0682***   
 (0.0191) (0.0199)    (0.0184) (0.0188)   
lT5 -0.0351 -0.0424*   lT5_ave -0.0387 -0.0482*   
 (0.0239) (0.0232)    (0.0272) (0.0266)   
lT4_1   -0.0505 -0.0918* lT4_1_ave   -0.024 -0.0675 
   (0.0488) (0.0527)    (0.0782) (0.0795) 
lfd 0.3397*** 0.3849*** 0.3379*** 0.3787*** lfd 0.3364*** 0.3804*** 0.3357*** 0.3769*** 
 (0.0575) (0.057) (0.0573) (0.0568)  (0.0576) (0.0575) (0.0572) (0.0568) 
lld_lio 0.1011* -0.0048 0.1084* 0.0026 lld_lio 0.0994* -0.006 0.1116* 0.0061 
 (0.0598) (0.0591) (0.06) (0.059)  (0.0596) (0.0588) (0.0595) (0.0587) 
lstate_own2 0.0358 0.1318** 0.0353 0.1333** lstate_own2 0.0272 0.1241** 0.0266 0.1271** 
 (0.0592) (0.0576) (0.059) (0.0573)  (0.059) (0.0573) (0.0589) (0.0572) 
lemphasis -0.0328 0.0509 -0.0309 0.0522 lemphasis -0.0438 0.0363 -0.041 0.0402 
 (0.085) (0.0834) (0.0856) (0.084)  (0.0844) (0.083) (0.0849) (0.0834) 
num_years_pre 0.4544***  0.4575***  num_years_pre 0.4535***  0.4611***  
 (0.0424)  (0.0426)   (0.042)  (0.0423)  
ave_loan_pre  -0.0898***  -0.0774** ave_loan_pre  -0.088***  -0.0792** 
  (0.033)  (0.0337)   (0.033)  (0.033) 
          
N 6377 6377 6378 6378  6414 6414 6414 6414 
N-cluster 1785 1785 1785 1785   1790 1790 1790 1790 
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Table 3.7 Step 2: Summary Statistics of Propensity Score Distribution of the Matching Sample 
 N  Mean   Median   Std Dev  min  25% 75% 90%  max  
ps_rating2 3643 0.6598 0.6916 0.1742 0.006 0.557 0.7907 0.8589 0.9852 
ps_rating1 3643 0.6598 0.6916 0.1741 0.0061 0.557 0.7906 0.8590 0.9669 
ps_diff 3643 0.0003 0.0001 0.0007 0 0 0.0003 0.0005 0.0183 
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Table 3.8 Step 2: Summary Statistics of the Matched Sample 
  
Rating = 1 
(N=3643) 
 Rating = 2 
(N=3643) 
  Mean   Std Dev   min   max    Mean   Std Dev   min   max  
lsize 13.34 1.81 9.44 17.06  13.36 1.80 7.60 17.06 
lzscore1 1.49 1.49 -2.45 31.20  1.49 1.57 -2.45 31.20 
lzscore2 0.62 1.18 -6.78 9.74  0.54 1.04 -6.78 10.37 
lstate_own2 0.61 0.49 0 1  0.63 0.48 0 1 
lfd 0.19 0.39 0 1  0.18 0.38 0 1 
num_years_pre 1.32 0.64 -2.43 2.52  1.37 0.65 -2.43 2.52 
num_loans_pre 2.36 0.97 0.00 5.04  2.55 0.97 0.00 5.04 
ave_loan_pre 19.72 1.45 16.81 23.72  19.74 1.41 16.81 23.72 
total_loan_pre 22.09 1.84 18.32 27.43  22.30 1.75 18.32 27.43 
lT1 0.06 0.34 -1.73 3.00  0.06 0.30 -1.73 2.55 
lT2 0.11 0.30 -1.92 1.81  0.11 0.23 -1.92 1.81 
lT3 0.03 0.08 -0.40 0.56  0.02 0.08 -0.40 0.96 
lT4 1.08 1.29 -0.48 26.89  1.02 1.36 -0.48 22.16 
lT5 0.82 1.05 0.00 12.35  0.87 1.18 0.00 19.22 
lT4_1 0.64 0.66 0.01 7.71  0.63 0.44 0.04 7.71 
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Table 3.9 Step 3 Test 3 Result: Probit Regressions for the Likelihood of Loan Default, and 
Financial Distress on Lag ratings 
This table shows marginal effects of probit regressions predicting the likelihood of a firm having a loan default or financial distress. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is one if a firm has a loan default for that year and zero otherwise. It follows the model: 
ܲሺܮܦ௧ሻ ൌ ܴ2௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜. The dependent variable in column (2) is one if a firm experience financial distress for that year and 
zero otherwise. It follows the model: ܲሺܨܦ௧ሻ ൌ ܴ2௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜. at-1 and bi are time and industry fixed effects; and R2, LD, and 
FD are all dummy variables. R2 stands for rating 2, and R2 =1 when ICR = 2, and R2 = 0 when ICR = 1. LD stands for loan default, 
and LD = 1 when ICR = (3, 4 or 5), and LD = 0 when ICR = (1 or 2). FD stands for financial distress and it is calculated as ܨܦ௧ ൌ
0,ݓ݄݁݊	 ܧܤܫ ሺܶா௡ௗି௢௙ି௒௘௔௥ሻ௧ ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ	ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐሺா௡௧௜௥௘	௒௘௔௥ሻ௧⁄ ൒ 1; and ܨܦ௧ ൌ 1, ܱݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁. Tests are done with both year and 
industry fixed effects. The intercepts are not reported. Robustness standard errors are clustered at the customer level and reported 
in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Matched Sample  Above-mean Matched Sample 
  
(1) 
LD 
(2) 
FD 
 (3) 
LD 
(4) 
FD 
ܴ2௧ିଵ 0.6127*** 0.2665***  0.3655*** 0.226*** 
  (0.0809) (0.0577)  (0.1055) (0.0872) 
        
# of 1s 484 848  359 485 
# of 0s 3576 3212  1728 1602 
N 4060 4060  2087 2087 
N-cluster 1351 1351  814 814 
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Table 3.10 Descriptive Statistic of Beijing and Guangdoing Sample 
 Panel A: Beijing Sample 
  
Annual Percentage of Financially Distressed Firms 
Among all Firms with Rollover Loans of That Year  
Annual Percentage of Defaulted Loans Among all 
Rollover Loans of That Year 
year 
Number 
FD Firms 
Number 
Rollover Firms 
Distressed / 
Rollover Firms 
  
Num Default 
Loans 
Num Rollover 
Loans 
Default / 
Rollover Loans 
1998 0 2814 0%   2448 9934 25% 
1999 2405 2614 92%  3152 8372 38% 
2000 1987 2233 89%  2013 6454 31% 
2001 1551 1679 92%  1448 4720 31% 
2002 1234 1351 91%  1222 4110 30% 
2003 960 1067 90%  996 3216 31% 
2004 558 626 89%  296 1711 17% 
2005 299 335 89%  353 874 40% 
2006 87 118 74%  41 375 11% 
2007 26 69 38%  0 322 0% 
2008 34 68 50%  3 278 1% 
2009 12 32 38%   0 127 0% 
 
Panel B: Guangdong Sample 
  
 
Annual Percentage of Financially Distressed Firms 
Among all Firms with Rollover Loans of That Year  
Annual Percentage of Defaulted Loans Among all 
Rollover Loans of That Year 
year 
Number 
FD Firms 
Number 
Rollover Firms 
Distressed / Rollover 
Firms 
Num Default 
Loans 
Num Rollover 
Loans 
Default / 
Rollover Loans 
1998 0 6421 0%   6329 15183 42% 
1999 3643 3819 95%  2669 8882 30% 
2000 3152 3332 95%  730 8266 9% 
2001 2419 2556 95%  667 6041 11% 
2002 1963 2077 95%  581 4785 12% 
2003 1504 1589 95%  389 3679 11% 
2004 1201 1272 94%  6620 9068 73% 
2005 435 464 94%  390 1275 31% 
2006 353 412 86%  222 1301 17% 
2007 259 377 69%  32 1174 3% 
2008 234 289 81%  44 902 5% 
2009 97 170 57%   31 520 6% 
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Table 3.11 Probit Regressions for the Likelihood of Getting Rollover Loans 
Liquidity, profitability, productivity, leverage and turnover corresponds to T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 as in Z-score 1. Tests are done 
with both year and industry fixed effects. The intercepts are not reported. Robustness standard errors are clustered at the customer 
level and reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 Beijing Sample  Guangdong Sample  
post -2.3632***  -1.1257***  
 (0.1911)  (0.0949)  
lSize1 -3.05E-10  -2.58E-09  
 (3.38E-10)  (1.75E-09)  
lFD1 0.3239***  0.5253***  
 (0.0644)  (0.0288)  
lLeverage1 -0.00633**  0.000441  
 (0.0028)  (0.00063)  
lLiquidity1 -0.1115  -0.0581  
 (0.0897)  (0.069)  
lProfit1 0.0447  0.000082  
 (0.0347)  (0.000454)  
lTurnOver1 -0.00014**  -0.00003  
 (0.000072)  (0.000039)  
lProductivity1 8.18E-07  -0.00001**  
 (8.82E-07)  (4.78E-06)  
post_lSize1 2.82E-10  2.69E-09  
 (3.39E-10)  (1.75E-09)  
post_lFD1 0.1264  -0.087  
 (0.223)  (0.0731)  
post_lLeverage1 0.2821  0.0462  
 (0.2312)  (0.0379)  
post_lLiquidity1 0.0368  -0.0421  
 (0.1067)  (0.083)  
post_lProfit1 -0.8403*  -1.3298***  
 (0.4763)  (0.217)  
post_lTurnOver1 0.000053  2.86E-06  
 (0.000093)  (0.000049)  
post_lProductivity1 -0.0002  -0.00141  
 (0.000433)  (0.00262)  
     
R-square 0.3178  0.1976  
Max-rescaled R-square 0.4857   0.273  
N-cluster 4453  21264  
rollover loans 10259  17968  
non-rollover loans 2951  34427  
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Table 3.12 Probit Regressions for the Likelihood of Getting Rating 2 VS. 1 
- 2 ratings regression for all industries 
This table provides results on 2 ratings (2 vs. 1) regressions on lag values of firms’ hard information. Liquidity, profitability, 
productivity, leverage and turnover corresponds to T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 as in Z-score 1. Tests are done with both year and industry 
fixed effects. The intercepts are not reported. Robustness standard errors are clustered at the customer level. ***, **, and * indicates 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Panel A. Beijing Sample 
  Pre-2005 sample w/o replacement Pre-2005 sample with replacement Post-2005 
Size1 -0.073*** -0.0726*** -0.0255***
 (0.0067) (0.0074) (0.0056)
lFD1 0.0014 0.0029 0.0033**
 (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0015)
lLeverage1 0.3387*** 0.3388*** 0.303***
 (0.0632) (0.0705) (0.0939)
lLiquidity1 -0.1677*** -0.2023*** -0.0947
 (0.0458) (0.057) (0.0598)
lProfit1 -0.6555*** -0.6726*** -0.7425***
 (0.1457) (0.16) (0.2046)
lTurnOver1 -0.0003 -0.0012 0.0003
 (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006)
lProductivity1 0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.0005
 (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005)
   
R-square 0.1465 0.1493 0.0892
Max-rescaled R-square 0.1955 0.1991 0.1317
N 5017 3913 5438
N-cluster 2519 2252 1968
rating=1 (bad ratings) 2587 1982 1377
rating=0(good ratings) 2430 1931 4061
 
Panel B. Guangdong Sample 
  Pre-2005 sample w/o replacement Pre-2005 sample with replacement Post-2005 
lSize1 -0.0673*** -0.0646*** -0.0237***
 (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0039)
lFD1 0.0015*** 0.0017*** 0.0032***
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
lLeverage1 0.0979*** 0.1171*** 0.3467***
 (0.0205) (0.0242) (0.0486)
lLiquidity1 -0.0221 -0.0143 -0.0224
 (0.0171) (0.0192) (0.0185)
lProfit1 -0.6016*** -0.596*** -0.6661***
 (0.053) (0.0606) (0.0812)
lTurnOver1 0.000003 0.00009 0.0008***
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
lProductivity1 0.0041*** 0.0035*** 0.0065***
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008)
   
R-square 0.0729 0.0709 0.0553
Max-rescaled R-square 0.0973 0.0946 0.0969
N 32004 22579 37123
N-cluster 12478 11129 12576
rating=1 (bad ratings) 15048 10799 5566
rating=0(good ratings) 16956 11780 31557
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Table 3.13 Robustness check: probit regressions for the Likelihood of Getting Rating 2 VS. 1 
- 2 ratings regression on manufacturing industry only 
This table provide results on 2 ratings (2 vs. 1) regressions on lag values of firms’ hard information. Liquidity, profitability, 
productivity, leverage and turnover corresponds to T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 as in Z-score 1. Tests are done with both year and industry 
fixed effects. The intercepts are not reported. Robustness standard errors are clustered at the customer level. ***, **, and * indicates 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Panel A. Beijing Sample 
  Pre-2005 sample w/o replacement Pre-2005 sample with replacement Post-2005 
lSize -0.3934*** -0.3512*** -0.6555**
 (0.1156) (0.0918) (0.2603)
lFD -0.0131 0.1144 -0.2262
 (0.0825) (0.0915) (0.1455)
lLeverage 0.1342*** 0.1723*** 0.1544***
 (0.0386) (0.0441) (0.056)
lLiquidity -0.2264*** -0.2683*** -0.1097
 (0.0562) (0.0602) (0.0905)
lProfit -0.2927*** -0.2031*** -0.1205*
 (0.0566) (0.0584) (0.0706)
lTurnOver -0.1276** -0.0769 -0.1249
 (0.062) (0.0671) (0.0767)
lProductivity 0.3684*** 0.05 0.1123
 (0.1158) (0.1243) (0.1844)
 
R-square 0.1701 0.1555 0.1484
Max-rescaled R-square 0.2268 0.2074 0.2101
N 1750 1447 1764
N-cluster 971 878 658
rating=1 (bad ratings) 865 718 532
rating=0(good ratings) 885 729 1232
  
Panel B. Guangdong Sample 
 Pre-2005 sample w/o replacement Pre-2005 sample with replacement Post-2005 
lSize -0.2834*** -0.3168*** -0.0744***
 (0.0204) (0.0247) (0.0237) 
lFD 0.3591*** 0.353*** 0.2767*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0297) (0.0247) 
lLeverage 0.2053*** 0.2117*** 0.1906*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0211) (0.0254) 
lLiquidity 0.0134 0.0431** -0.0064 
 (0.0169) (0.0197) (0.0225) 
lProfit -0.2684*** -0.2527*** -0.1792*** 
 (0.0179) (0.021) (0.0243) 
lTurnOver -0.0302 -0.0356 -0.082*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0268) (0.0303) 
lProductivity 0.2383*** 0.2594*** 0.1865*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0413) (0.0409) 
    
R-square 0.0994 0.0995 0.0629 
Max-rescaled R-square 0.1329 0.1329 0.1126 
N 15716 10898 18124 
N-cluster 5882 5218 6086 
rating=1 (bad ratings) 7154 5029 2578 
rating=0(good ratings) 8562 5869 15546 
 
91 
 
Table 3.14 Probit Regressions for the Likelihood of Loan Default, and Financial Distress on Lag ratings 
(for all industries and for Beijing Sample only) 
This table shows marginal effects of probit regressions predicting the likelihood of a firm having a loan default or financial distress. The dependent variable in columns (1) is one if 
a firm has a loan default for that year and zero otherwise. It follows the model: ܲሺܮܦ௧ሻ ൌ ܴ2௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜. The dependent variable in column (2) is one if a firm experience 
financial distress for that year and zero otherwise. It follows the model: ܲሺܨܦ௧ሻ ൌ ܴ2௧ିଵ ൅ ܽ௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ௜. at-1 and bi are time and industry fixed effects; and R2, LD, and FD are all 
dummy variables. R2 stands for rating 2, and R2 =1 when ICR = 2, and R2 = 0 when ICR = 1. LD stands for loan default, and LD = 1 when ICR = (3, 4 or 5), and LD = 0 when ICR 
= (1 or 2). FD stands for financial distress and it is calculated as ܨܦ௧ ൌ 0,ݓ݄݁݊	 ܧܤܫ ሺܶா௡ௗି௢௙ି௒௘௔௥ሻ௧ ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ	ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐሺா௡௧௜௥௘	௒௘௔௥ሻ௧⁄ ൒ 1; and ܨܦ௧ ൌ 1, ܱݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁. Tests are 
done with both year and industry fixed effects. The intercepts are not reported. Robustness standard errors are clustered at the customer level and reported in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  LD    FD 
  Pre-period Post-period entire period entire period  entire period    Pre-period Post-period entire period entire period entire period 
ܴ2௧ିଵ 0.7589*** 3.4999*** 0.7802*** 0.7496***  0.4473*** 0.6098*** 0.5041*** 0.4386*** 
  (0.0714) (0.2075)  (0.0636) (0.064)   ( 0.0567) (0.2037)  (0.0544) (0.056) 
݌݋ݏݐ   -4.0836*** -3.4656***    -1.2873*** -0.9939*** 
    (0.0304)  (0.0629)     (0.1414)  (0.1445) 
ܴ2௧ିଵ ∗ ݌݋ݏݐ   3.7296*** -0.4855*** 2.9782***    0.4117** -1.0066*** -0.0187 
    (0.16) (0.1604) (0.1721)     (0.1875) (0.1321) (0.1947) 
              
# of 1s 746 10 756 756 756   4951 115 5066 5066 5066 
# of 0s 5252 310 5562 5562 5562   864 112 976 976 976 
N 5998 320 6318 6318 6318   5815 227 6042 6042 6042 
N-cluster 2057 213 2123 2123 2123    2009 181 2052 2052 2052 
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Table 3.15 Definitions of Variables 
Variable 
names 
Baseline model variable Alternative model variables 
Size Size = log(total assets) 1. Log (net operating income); 
2. Log(total assets – fees to be apportioned – 
prepaid assets – notes receivable – net 
receivables - long-term investment - 
invisible assets – deferral taxes and credit) 
3. Log(total ownership interest + few partner 
rights – invisible assets – fees to be 
apportioned – prepaid assets – deferral taxes 
and credit) 
Z-score Zscore1 Zscore2 
lzscore1_ave=mean(zscore1t-1,zscore1t-2); 
lzscore2_ave=mean(zscore2t-1,zscore2t-2); 
lT1_ave = average (lagT1,lag2T1); 
lT2_ave = average (lagT2,lag2T2); 
lT3_ave = average (lagT3,lag2T3); 
lT4_ave = average (lagT4,lag2T4); 
lT5_ave = average (lagT5,lag2T5); 
lT4_1_ave = average (lagT4_1,lag2T4_1) 
fd FDt = 0 when EBIT at End of year t / Interest 
Payment Entire Year t >=1; FDt = 1 Otherwise 
 
Ld_io Ld_io = 1 if ld=1 or io=1; Ld_io=0 otherwise; 
ld = 1 if ICR = (3,4,5), ld=0 otherwise; 
io = 1 if interest over due flag = 1;io=0 otherwise 
 
State_own State_own = 1 if state ownership indicator is 1; 
State_own = 0 otherwise 
 
emphasis Emphasis = 1 if emphasis flag from the database 
= 1; emphasis = 0 otherwise 
 
 
Continued on the next page 
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Table 3.15 Definitions of Variables (Continued) 
Variable 
names 
Baseline model variable  Alternative model variables  
Relationship 
measures 
Num_years_pre = log(bank firm years) 
 
 
Num_loans_pre = log(number of loans) 
Ave_loans_pre = log (average loan amount) 
total_loans_pre = log(total loan amount) 
Num_years_dummy = 1 if bank firm years of this 
firm >= mean (bank firm years of all sample firms); = 0 
otherwise; 
Num_loans_dummy = 1 if number of loans of this 
firm >= mean (number of loans of all sample firms); = 
0 otherwise; 
Ave_loans_dummy = 1 if average loan amount issued 
by the Bank to this firm  >= mean (average loan amount 
issued by the Bank to all sample firms); = 0 otherwise; 
total_loans_dummy = 1 if total loan amount issued by 
the Bank to this firm >= mean (total loan amount issued 
by the Bank to all sample firms); = 0 otherwise 
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